2017年6月12日 星期一

BRI筆記 - MPEP 2111

筆記

申請專利範圍為專利的靈魂，解釋專利範圍為專利審查與訴訟中最重要的環節，但如果每個審查委員、審查單位的解釋的標準有所偏差，專利申請人/發明人將可能無所適從，專利權無法確定將造成很多困擾，因此法院索性規定專利審查單位都應該要以「最廣且合理的解釋（Broadest and Reasonable Interpretation，BRI）」來解釋專利範圍，BRI成為USPTO, PTAB審理專利有效性時解釋專利範圍的原則。

BRI議題很精彩，曾有報導如：

MPEP 2111界定解釋申請專利範圍的原則：最廣且合理的解釋，一開始就說，申請專利範圍應在說明書的支持下給予最廣且合理的解釋（"broadcast reasonable interpretation in light of the specification"）。

本篇MPEP幾個重點：
  • 在USPTO專利審查階段，解釋專利範圍應與說明書一致下給予最廣且和裡的解釋。
  • Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2005)是本篇很重要的依據。
  • 審查時，專利範圍不能僅以請求項用語來看，而以發明相關領域一般技術人員在說明書內容支持下給予最廣且合理的解釋。
  • 請求項中用語的解釋應得到說明書明確的支持，其意義應以說明書來確認解釋內容。
  • 在法院審理侵權與專利有效性時，並不採用最廣且合理的解釋原則，而須根據專利審查記錄來解釋。
  • 反之，專利審查階段係給予專利申請人合理而清楚界定專利範圍的時機，讓申請人建立審查記錄，因此無須與法院有相同的標準（而是成為法院解釋專利範圍的基礎）。
  • 專利申請人在專利審查階段有機會修正專利範圍，此時以BRI原則解釋可以降低請求項的不確定性。
  • 參照說明書來讀申請專利範圍，藉此解釋請求項中引用的限制，但此"並不同於"將說明書的內容解釋到專利範圍，而以揭露內容來限縮專利範圍。（"The court explained that “reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim.”"）
  • 最廣且合理解釋並不是指最廣可能的解釋。（"broadest reasonable interpretation does not mean the broadest possible interpretation"）
  • 反之，請求項用語的意思應符合其普通而常見的意思，除非說明書有明確特定的定義。
  • 申請專利範圍的BRI應符合相關領域技術人員的解釋。

my two cents:
這句話很重要，參照說明書解釋專利範圍，"不同於"用說明書內容來限縮專利範圍。

總之，即便給予申請專利範圍最廣且合理的解釋（BRI），仍要參照說明書的內容才能提供合理的解釋，並且由相關領域中的技術人員來看，請求項用語應根據相關領域的技術人員給予一般而普通的意義，除非說明書有其他定義。法院不必如專利審查單位的BRI標準。

[MPEP]
MPEP 2111    CLAIM INTERPRETATION; BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION

CLAIMS MUST BE GIVEN THEIR BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION IN LIGHT OF THE SPECIFICATION
During patent examination, the pending claims must be “given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) expressly recognized that the USPTO employs the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard:
The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) determines the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction “in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364[, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1830] (Fed. Cir. 2004). Indeed, the rules of the PTO require that application claims must “conform to the invention as set forth in the remainder of the specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the description.” 37 CFR 1.75(d)(1).
See also In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1259, 94 USPQ2d 1640, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 USPQ2d 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Patented claims are not given the broadest reasonable interpretation during court proceedings involving infringement and validity, and can be interpreted based on a fully developed prosecution record. In contrast, an examiner must construe claim terms in the broadest reasonable manner during prosecution as is reasonably allowed in an effort to establish a clear record of what applicant intends to claim. Thus, the Office does not interpret claims in the same manner as the courts. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Because applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution, giving a claim its broadest reasonable interpretation will reduce the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow.”); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969) (Claim 9 was directed to a process of analyzing data generated by mass spectrographic analysis of a gas. The process comprised selecting the data to be analyzed by subjecting the data to a mathematical manipulation. The examiner made rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101 and 35 U.S.C. 102. In the 35 U.S.C. 102 rejection, the examiner explained that the claim was anticipated by a mental process augmented by pencil and paper markings. The court agreed that the claim was not limited to using a machine to carry out the process since the claim did not explicitly set forth the machine. The court explained that “reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim.” The court found that applicant was advocating the latter, i.e., the impermissible importation of subject matter from the specification into the claim.). See also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The court held that the PTO is not required, in the course of prosecution, to interpret claims in applications in the same manner as a court would interpret claims in an infringement suit. Rather, the “PTO applies to verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in applicant’s specification.”).

The broadest reasonable interpretation does not mean the broadest possible interpretation. Rather, the meaning given to a claim term must be consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the term (unless the term has been given a special definition in the specification), and must be consistent with the use of the claim term in the specification and drawings. Further, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims must be consistent with the interpretation that those skilled in the art would reach. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359, 49 USPQ2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (The Board’s construction of the claim limitation “restore hair growth” as requiring the hair to be returned to its original state was held to be an incorrect interpretation of the limitation. The court held that, consistent with applicant’s disclosure and the disclosure of three patents from analogous arts using the same phrase to require only some increase in hair growth, one of ordinary skill would construe “restore hair growth” to mean that the claimed method increases the amount of hair grown on the scalp, but does not necessarily produce a full head of hair.). Thus the focus of the inquiry regarding the meaning of a claim should be what would be reasonable from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260, 94 USPQ2d 1640, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 84 USPQ2d 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In Buszard, the claim was directed to a flame retardant composition comprising a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture. 504 F.3d at 1365, 84 USPQ2d at 1750. The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s interpretation that equated a “flexible” foam with a crushed “rigid” foam was not reasonable. Id. at 1367, 84 USPQ2d at 1751. Persuasive argument was presented that persons experienced in the field of polyurethane foams know that a flexible mixture is different than a rigid foam mixture. Id. at 1366, 84 USPQ2d at 1751.
Ron
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