本案為專利申請人EILEEN C. SMITH針對USPTO對系爭案發出最終核駁後提出的訴願案 - Ex parte Smith, 2018-000064 (Feb. 1, 2019),其中系爭案的專利範圍有兩個方向,一是電腦相關的技術,另一是技術本質為商業活動,但其中是否具有實際的應用成為101議題的關鍵。
其中特別的是,參照了2019版專利適格性備忘錄的訴願案,可參考本部落格報導:USPTO的2019開年禮之一 - 適格性指導方針(https://enpan.blogspot.com/2019/01/uspto2019.html)
案件資訊:
專利申請人:EILEEN C. SMITH等
訴願號碼:Appeal 2018-000064
系爭案申請號:13/715,476
系爭案13/715,476涉及抽象概念的混合交易系統,Claim 1界定一在混合交換系統中衍生交易方法,步驟大致包括收集訂單、在市場中識別一個電子交易引擎,資料庫中移除訂單的一部分,當延遲執行時進行報價,接收第二報價,以及分配訂單。
1. A method of trading derivatives in a hybrid exchange system comprising:
collecting orders, via a communication network and order routing system, for derivatives and placing them in an electronic book database;
identifying at an electronic trade engine a new quote from a first in-crowd market participant, wherein one of a bid or an offer price in the new quote matches a respective price in an order in the electronic book database from a public customer;
removing at least a portion of the order in the electronic book database, delaying automatic execution of the new quote and the order, and starting a timer;
reporting, via the communication network and an electronic reporting system, a market quote indicative of execution of the at least a portion of the order while delaying automatic execution;
receiving at the electronic trade engine a second quote from a second in-crowd market participant after receiving the new quote from the first in-crowd market participant and before an expiration of the timer, wherein the second quote matches the respective price of the public customer order in the electronic book database; and
allocating the order between the first and second in-crowd market participants at the electronic trade engine, wherein the order is not executed until expiration of the timer.
這樣的專利範圍顯然是會面對35 U.S.C. 101專利適格性的議題,自然地會以Alice案例形成的TWO-STEP規則檢驗專利適格性,TWO-STEP規則在相同概念下有多種詮釋方式,這裡用本篇PTAB說法:
(1)判斷申請專利範圍是否涉及不可專利概念(patent-ineligible concept),對於本次系爭案,則是判斷是否涉及抽象概念(abstract idea)?
(2)如果涉及抽象概念等不可專利標的,即考量申請專利範圍中的元件的個別或其組合,是否具有額外元件(additional elements)可以轉換不可專利標的為可專利的應用?
就最高法院的描述,上述步驟(2)就是找專利範圍中是否具有「進步特徵(inventive concept)」,也就是找專利範圍中是否有任一元件或元件的組合可以讓此專利實質超越(significantly more)不可專利的概念本身。
案件:Alice Corp. v. CLS Bankint'l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014),參考報導:抽象概念若僅以一般目的電腦實現,不可專利 - Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International (2014)(http://enpan.blogspot.tw/2014/06/alice-corporation-pty-ltd-v-cls-bank.html)
根據USPTO於2019年初發布的專利適格性審查指導方針(https://enpan.blogspot.com/2019/01/uspto2019.html),對TWO-STEP提出一些修正:
[2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance]
(1)專利標的是否涉及法定例外,如數學概念、組織人類互動(如基本經濟活動、心智程序)?
(2)專利範圍是否具有可轉換法定例外的標的為實際的應用(practical application)額外元件(additional element)?
如果上述兩個條件都是否定的,就:
(3)是否有特定限制超越法定例外,也就是不是已知(well-understood)、常規(routine)與習知(conventional)的特徵?
(4)如果僅是簡單地附加這些已知、常規與習知活動,僅描述上位概念(specified at a high level of
generality),仍是屬於法定例外的不可專利的情況。
"抽象概念"
針對本次系爭案申請專利範圍,依照2019年專利適格性審查指導方針,申請專利範圍描述的動作如收集、識別與報告,就如基本經濟活動,屬於抽象概念。
"額外元件"
系爭案專利範圍描述了一般電腦元件執行了一般電腦功能,這些屬於已知、常規與習知的活動,並沒有實質超越在一般目的電腦上運作的抽象概念。
"實質超越"
系爭案申請專利範圍中元件或元件之組合是否有實質超越上位揭露的交易系統,在本案中,判斷系爭案沒有加入有意義的限制。
對於專利申請人而言,自然是極力辯解,引用對專利適格性正面的案例(如DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. (Fed. Cir. 2014)),主張系爭案專利範圍並非單純引述商業活動,而將之應用在網路上而已,並認為系爭案發明改善了技術問題,認為審查委員認為專利為抽象概念有過廣解釋的問題。
"本案"
PTAB依照2019年專利適格性審查指導方針,列出其中幾樣法定例外不可專利的項目,有:(1)數學概念;(2)組織人類行為(基礎經濟活動);以及(3)心智程序。
本次系爭案發明屬於其中第(2)種。
若以BRI解釋原則來看,系爭案發明步驟如collecting, identifying, removing, reporting, receiving等,涉及基本的經濟活動,為抽象概念。
接著,PTAB委員將專利範圍分為兩個群組,一個是「電腦相關技術」,PTAB認為專利範圍與說明書對電腦系統並沒有有意義的細節,不足以將法定例外轉換為實用的應用。("we do not find the computer-related limitations are sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.")
另一是有關專利標的的「混合衍生物的交易系統」,專利範圍顯示的額外限制有:(1)延遲自動執行新訂單;(2)接收第二報價;(3)在不同市場參與者之間分配訂單。
(1)"delaying automatic execution of the new quote and the order, and starting a timer," (2) while "delaying automatic execution" of the order, and "before expiration of the timer," receiving a second matching quote "wherein the second quote matches the respective price of the public customer order," and (3) "allocating the order between the first and second in-crowd market participants at the electronic trade engine, wherein the order is not executed
until expiration of the timer."
意思就是,PTAB委員十分"合理"地將專利範圍分為電腦技術與實質要執行的商業活動,電腦系統因為採用了一般目的電腦,縱有特殊的部分,但整體並沒有太有意義的限制,但本篇有關衍生交易的技術卻有值得提及的技術特徵,因此,PTAB委員認為系爭案申請專利範圍將不可專利的法定例外成功地轉換為實際的應用上(integrate judicial exception into a practical application)。
PTAB委員認為系爭案發明解決了技術問題,有技術的改善("the use of the claimed timing mechanisms and the associated temporary restraints on execution of trades provide a specific technological improvement over prior derivatives trading systems.")
結論:we conclude claim 1 is integrated into a practical application, and under the guidance provided in the Memorandum, the claim is eligible because it is not directed to the recited judicial exception.
如此,PTAB否決USPTO作出專利不符適格性的意見。
DDR案參考:商業方法可專利性?電腦軟體專利的生機 - DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com (Fed. 2014)案例討論(https://enpan.blogspot.com/2014/12/ddr-holdings-v-hotelscom-fed-2014.html)
my two cents:
2019年初的專利適格性加入的判斷原則讓不少受到101質疑的專利產生轉機,本篇即是一個不錯的案例,也讓USPTO列為案例。
將來,有更多商業方法可以採用此案答辯標準,可將電腦技術分離出來(這些電腦元件與功能通常為已知、常規與習知),直接討論專利要解決的問題,並且提出實際的用途,就有機會答辯成功。
USPTO檔案:
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fd2018-000064.pdf
Ron
潘榮恩專利部落格、專利實務、專利筆記與Linux
enpan's Patent & Linux practice
(http://enpan.blogspot.tw/, http://enpan.blogspot.com/)
(接受委託安排課程)
ronpan@gmail.com,
enpan@msn.com
2019年8月30日 星期五
「合理成功的期待」與「結合動機」 - Endo v. Actavis (Fed. Cir. 2019)
本篇討論103議題中有關(1)先前技術是否讓PHOSITA有達成系爭專利發明合理成功的期待?以及(2)先前技術是否有組合的動機? - Endo v. Actavis (Fed. Cir. 2019)
案件資訊:
原告/被上訴人:ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS INC., MALLINCKRODT LLC
被告/上訴人:ACTAVIS LLC, FKA ACTAVIS INC., ACTAVIS SOUTH ATLANTIC LLC, TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.
系爭專利:US8,871,779
判決日:May 3, 2019
Endo是系爭專利US8,871,779的專屬被授權人,對Actavis公司提起專利侵權訴訟,被告在地院提起專利無效的請願,但因為證據不足(沒有清楚而有說服力的證據),無法證明專利無效,就直接審理侵權議題。
系爭專利關於一種嗎啡鹼(morphinan alkaloids),如一種opioid oxymorphone(腦內啡氧化嗎啡酮),Claim 1描述一種氧化嗎啡酮的鹽酸鹽,其包含少於0.001%的14-羥基氧化嗎啡酮。(參考Google翻譯)
1. A hydrochloride salt of oxymorphone comprising less than 0.001% of 14-hydroxymorphinone.
4. A hydrochloride salt of a morphinan-6-one compound corresponding to Formula (2):
comprising less than 0.001% measured by HPLC of an α,β-unsaturated ketone compound corresponding to Formula (3):
wherein the morphinan-6-one compound is oxymorphone and wherein X is —N(R17)—;
R1 and R2 are hydrogen;
R3 is hydroxy;
R10 is hydrogen;
R14 is hydroxy; and
R17 is methyl.
----------------------------------------------------------
上訴的議題:專利性(35 U.S.C. 103(a))。
除了專利性爭議外(被告當庭提出三件先前技術),侵權審判的第一步驟為解釋專利範圍,解釋專利範圍的一般原則為Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005),從以相關領域一般技術人員根據請求項文字進行一般理解,參酌內部證據(說明書、審查歷史),需要時再參考外部證據(專家證詞、實驗數據)。
本案為化學案,在此不贅述技術問題,CAFC同意地方法院根據內部與外部證據得出的解釋,反而依照系爭專利說明書的內容,有更廣的解釋空間。
接著是非顯而易見性(35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006),pre-AIA),關於先前技術是否提供相關領域一般技術人員有達成系爭專利發明的合理成功的期待,CAFC同意地院決定,認為:
(1)相關領域一般技術人員根據先前技術的組合並沒有合理期待的成功("PHOSITA Would Not Have a Reasonable Expectation of Success in Combining the Prior Art"),法院認為PHOSITA對於使用先前技術Weiss與Chapman的組合並沒有合理成功的期待(reasonable expectation of success),其中缺少關鍵的化學反應。(其中參考了Endo的專家證詞)
(2)針對第三個引證前案Rapoport,PHOSITA對於使用Rapoport沒有合理成功地以其中添加物與製程去除系爭專利不要的雜質。
(3)根據上述三件先前技術,無法提供PHOSITA達成系爭專利發明的合理成功的期待。(其中參考了FDA說法)
「市場力量(market force)」:
這時,FDA(美國食品藥物管理局)有個很重要的角色,FDA引用「市場力量(market force )」的概念,市場力量激勵「氧化嗎啡酮(oxymorphone)的純化」達到如系爭專利請求項指出的水平,
"The FDA communications introduced a market force incentivizing purification of oxymorphone to the level of the oxymorphone claimed by the Asserted Claims."
關於先前技術「結合的動機(motivation to combine)」:
根據案例Plantron-ics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013),所謂「結合的動機(motivation to combine)」可以從明示或暗示出「市場力量(market force)」得出,以及根據系爭專利發明當時的設計需求、相關領域已知需求與問題,加上PHOSITA的通常知識來判斷。
因此FDA的說法可能影響PHOSITA是否有動機去組合先前技術去發展如系爭專利發明的產品的判斷!
然而,根據案例Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs. (Fed. Cir. 2008),法院提出所述問題的理解,與解決問題的動機與「結合特定文獻的動機」完全不同(“Knowledge of a problem and motivation to solve it are entirely different from motivation to combine particular references.”),因此,使得法院認為FDA的說法反而表示了發明與被授權的公司面臨的挑戰,無法證明PHOSITA可以根據先前技術達成系爭專利發明。
如此,CAFC法官認為,根據上述系爭專利範圍的解釋,以及發明與先前技術之間是否有合理成功的期待,先前技術是否有結合的動機,加上認定FDA的說法反而證明發明的難度,系爭專利具有非顯而易見性。
判決文:
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/18-1054.Opinion.5-3-2019.pdf(備份:https://app.box.com/s/300384rcxkublnb5rrhsx7xsif88l8qh)
Ron
案件資訊:
原告/被上訴人:ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS INC., MALLINCKRODT LLC
被告/上訴人:ACTAVIS LLC, FKA ACTAVIS INC., ACTAVIS SOUTH ATLANTIC LLC, TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.
系爭專利:US8,871,779
判決日:May 3, 2019
Endo是系爭專利US8,871,779的專屬被授權人,對Actavis公司提起專利侵權訴訟,被告在地院提起專利無效的請願,但因為證據不足(沒有清楚而有說服力的證據),無法證明專利無效,就直接審理侵權議題。
系爭專利關於一種嗎啡鹼(morphinan alkaloids),如一種opioid oxymorphone(腦內啡氧化嗎啡酮),Claim 1描述一種氧化嗎啡酮的鹽酸鹽,其包含少於0.001%的14-羥基氧化嗎啡酮。(參考Google翻譯)
1. A hydrochloride salt of oxymorphone comprising less than 0.001% of 14-hydroxymorphinone.
4. A hydrochloride salt of a morphinan-6-one compound corresponding to Formula (2):
comprising less than 0.001% measured by HPLC of an α,β-unsaturated ketone compound corresponding to Formula (3):
wherein the morphinan-6-one compound is oxymorphone and wherein X is —N(R17)—;
R1 and R2 are hydrogen;
R3 is hydroxy;
R10 is hydrogen;
R14 is hydroxy; and
R17 is methyl.
----------------------------------------------------------
上訴的議題:專利性(35 U.S.C. 103(a))。
除了專利性爭議外(被告當庭提出三件先前技術),侵權審判的第一步驟為解釋專利範圍,解釋專利範圍的一般原則為Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005),從以相關領域一般技術人員根據請求項文字進行一般理解,參酌內部證據(說明書、審查歷史),需要時再參考外部證據(專家證詞、實驗數據)。
本案為化學案,在此不贅述技術問題,CAFC同意地方法院根據內部與外部證據得出的解釋,反而依照系爭專利說明書的內容,有更廣的解釋空間。
接著是非顯而易見性(35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006),pre-AIA),關於先前技術是否提供相關領域一般技術人員有達成系爭專利發明的合理成功的期待,CAFC同意地院決定,認為:
(1)相關領域一般技術人員根據先前技術的組合並沒有合理期待的成功("PHOSITA Would Not Have a Reasonable Expectation of Success in Combining the Prior Art"),法院認為PHOSITA對於使用先前技術Weiss與Chapman的組合並沒有合理成功的期待(reasonable expectation of success),其中缺少關鍵的化學反應。(其中參考了Endo的專家證詞)
(2)針對第三個引證前案Rapoport,PHOSITA對於使用Rapoport沒有合理成功地以其中添加物與製程去除系爭專利不要的雜質。
(3)根據上述三件先前技術,無法提供PHOSITA達成系爭專利發明的合理成功的期待。(其中參考了FDA說法)
「市場力量(market force)」:
這時,FDA(美國食品藥物管理局)有個很重要的角色,FDA引用「市場力量(market force )」的概念,市場力量激勵「氧化嗎啡酮(oxymorphone)的純化」達到如系爭專利請求項指出的水平,
"The FDA communications introduced a market force incentivizing purification of oxymorphone to the level of the oxymorphone claimed by the Asserted Claims."
關於先前技術「結合的動機(motivation to combine)」:
根據案例Plantron-ics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013),所謂「結合的動機(motivation to combine)」可以從明示或暗示出「市場力量(market force)」得出,以及根據系爭專利發明當時的設計需求、相關領域已知需求與問題,加上PHOSITA的通常知識來判斷。
因此FDA的說法可能影響PHOSITA是否有動機去組合先前技術去發展如系爭專利發明的產品的判斷!
然而,根據案例Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs. (Fed. Cir. 2008),法院提出所述問題的理解,與解決問題的動機與「結合特定文獻的動機」完全不同(“Knowledge of a problem and motivation to solve it are entirely different from motivation to combine particular references.”),因此,使得法院認為FDA的說法反而表示了發明與被授權的公司面臨的挑戰,無法證明PHOSITA可以根據先前技術達成系爭專利發明。
如此,CAFC法官認為,根據上述系爭專利範圍的解釋,以及發明與先前技術之間是否有合理成功的期待,先前技術是否有結合的動機,加上認定FDA的說法反而證明發明的難度,系爭專利具有非顯而易見性。
判決文:
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/18-1054.Opinion.5-3-2019.pdf(備份:https://app.box.com/s/300384rcxkublnb5rrhsx7xsif88l8qh)
Ron
2019年8月29日 星期四
沒有立場的訴訟仍建立提起IPR的time bar - GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., Case IPR2018-01754
這是USPTO指定案例(Precedential Opinion Panel decision)- GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., Case IPR2018-01754
案件資訊:
IPR請願人:GOPRO, INC.
專利權人:360HEROS, INC.
系爭專利:US9,152,019
IPR案:IPR2018-01754
系爭專利關於360度照相機組:
主要專利範圍描述這個支撐多個照相機的結構:
360Heros的產品是支援GoPro的,列舉一例(https://shop.360rize.com/product/360rize-pro10-tcs-360-plug-n-play-rig-for-gopro-hero4/):
本案緣起GoPro對360Heros這個公司(從系爭專利來看,360Heros出產包括GoPro攝影機的週邊設備)提起商標侵權(有關「HERO」)、不公平競爭與著作權侵權等訴訟,360Heros火大,反過來對GoPro提起侵權訴訟。
不過,GoPro主張提起訴訟的當時,360Heros並未真正取得專利權,因為當時發明人並未正式簽署讓渡書給360Heros,因此缺乏訴訟立場,地院也就撤銷訴訟(缺乏訴訟立場,lack of standing)。
之後,GoPro公司對系爭專利提起IPR異議程序,本案爭議是關於雙方「訴訟利害關係」,根據35 U.S.C. § 315(b)規定,IPR異議應於專利侵權訴訟告訴之後一年內提出,這個IPR異議距離當時360Heros提起專利侵權訴訟(同時進行的有兩案,超過一年的是California地方法院案)的時間已經超過一年。
專利權人360Hero自然就在初步答覆IPR意見時主張GoPro提起IPR的時間點已經超過California案一年,引用前例Click-To-Call Techs., LP v. Ingenio, Inc., 899 F.3d 1321, 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018):
"Click-To-Call"
這是專利權人強力主張的時間限制(time bar)案例:
360Heros主張,即便原本訴訟被撤銷,但根據35 U.S.C. § 315(b),並沒有其他影響一年的時間限制(time bar)的例外。
不過,當時PTAB並未接受專利權人360Heros認為GoPro提出IPR的時間"已經超過提起訴訟時間一年"的主張,且啟始IPR審理,理由是當時訴訟被撤銷,沒有建立35 U.S.C. § 315(b)的時間限制(time bar)。
於是,專利權人360Heros於是對PTAB決定提起再審(rehearing)與請求先例意見小組(Precedential Opinion Panel,POP)的審理。
--------------------------
[法條]
35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
35 U.S. Code § 315. Relation to other proceedings or actions
...
(b)Patent Owner’s Action.— An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).
...
對於GoPro而言,主張"Click-To-Call"並非針對訴訟立場的處理,對本案無影響;360Heros則主張"Click-To-Call"制約了本案的發展,即便當時訴訟因為沒有立場被撤銷,仍已經建立315(b)的time bar,沒有影響"Click-To-Call"的效力,認為GoPro已經沒有提起IPR異議的立場。
POP意見:
POP認為,雖然"Click-To-Call"沒有明確描述啟始IPR的時間條件,但關於35 U.S.C. § 315(b)根據「控訴(complaint,提交訴狀)」建立的time bar,即便判斷為缺乏立場(lacking standing),"Click-To-Call"案所指time bar已然成立。
(字面上關於served with a complaint建立的time bar,沒有例外)
也就是說,即便是沒有立場的訴狀,仍產生了對於時間限制的效力,畢竟後續的IPR程序仍是基於這個不成立的訴訟。
POP的意見:
"We agree with, and follow, the Federal Circuit’s decision that “served with a complaint alleging infringement” in § 315(b) is plain and unambiguous, and means “presented with a complaint or delivered a complaint in a manner prescribed by law.”"
因此,GoPro對系爭專利提起IPR異議時已經超過前述360Heros提起訴訟後超過一年,POP要求PTAB作出拒絕啟始的決定。
my two cents:
以上兩個事件串起來,成為一個很特別的議題,也就是,提出侵權告訴時,專利權人竟然還未取得專利授權(發明人並未正式簽署讓渡書),因此訴訟被撤銷,但侵權被告提起IPR的時間又超過這個沒有成立的訴訟提告時間的法定時間(一年),經過專利權人主張違反35 U.S.C. § 315(b),後者也被撤銷。
提起IPR的時機顯然是嚴肅的程序問題,即便最初訴訟不成立或缺乏立場,仍有效地建立了time bar。
另外,本案中,PTAB/POP委員走在比較安全的線上,如果作出強加於法律表面文字上的許多解釋,可能有超越職權的問題,例如何謂"compliant",是否是成功地受理才算,還是沒有立場問題才算?這就有完沒完,因此,法律文字本身,字面上的意思,勝於額外強加的許多解釋。
PTAB決定:
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., Case IPR2018-01754 POP decision.pdf
(備份:https://app.box.com/s/a4eqoqnmdsdijx0bq5xc6qkx44zzr091)
資料參考:
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/08/precedent-infringement-patentee.html
Ron
案件資訊:
IPR請願人:GOPRO, INC.
專利權人:360HEROS, INC.
系爭專利:US9,152,019
IPR案:IPR2018-01754
系爭專利關於360度照相機組:
主要專利範圍描述這個支撐多個照相機的結構:
360Heros的產品是支援GoPro的,列舉一例(https://shop.360rize.com/product/360rize-pro10-tcs-360-plug-n-play-rig-for-gopro-hero4/):
本案緣起GoPro對360Heros這個公司(從系爭專利來看,360Heros出產包括GoPro攝影機的週邊設備)提起商標侵權(有關「HERO」)、不公平競爭與著作權侵權等訴訟,360Heros火大,反過來對GoPro提起侵權訴訟。
不過,GoPro主張提起訴訟的當時,360Heros並未真正取得專利權,因為當時發明人並未正式簽署讓渡書給360Heros,因此缺乏訴訟立場,地院也就撤銷訴訟(缺乏訴訟立場,lack of standing)。
之後,GoPro公司對系爭專利提起IPR異議程序,本案爭議是關於雙方「訴訟利害關係」,根據35 U.S.C. § 315(b)規定,IPR異議應於專利侵權訴訟告訴之後一年內提出,這個IPR異議距離當時360Heros提起專利侵權訴訟(同時進行的有兩案,超過一年的是California地方法院案)的時間已經超過一年。
專利權人360Hero自然就在初步答覆IPR意見時主張GoPro提起IPR的時間點已經超過California案一年,引用前例Click-To-Call Techs., LP v. Ingenio, Inc., 899 F.3d 1321, 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018):
"Click-To-Call"
這是專利權人強力主張的時間限制(time bar)案例:
360Heros主張,即便原本訴訟被撤銷,但根據35 U.S.C. § 315(b),並沒有其他影響一年的時間限制(time bar)的例外。
不過,當時PTAB並未接受專利權人360Heros認為GoPro提出IPR的時間"已經超過提起訴訟時間一年"的主張,且啟始IPR審理,理由是當時訴訟被撤銷,沒有建立35 U.S.C. § 315(b)的時間限制(time bar)。
於是,專利權人360Heros於是對PTAB決定提起再審(rehearing)與請求先例意見小組(Precedential Opinion Panel,POP)的審理。
--------------------------
[法條]
35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
35 U.S. Code § 315. Relation to other proceedings or actions
...
(b)Patent Owner’s Action.— An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).
...
對於GoPro而言,主張"Click-To-Call"並非針對訴訟立場的處理,對本案無影響;360Heros則主張"Click-To-Call"制約了本案的發展,即便當時訴訟因為沒有立場被撤銷,仍已經建立315(b)的time bar,沒有影響"Click-To-Call"的效力,認為GoPro已經沒有提起IPR異議的立場。
POP意見:
POP認為,雖然"Click-To-Call"沒有明確描述啟始IPR的時間條件,但關於35 U.S.C. § 315(b)根據「控訴(complaint,提交訴狀)」建立的time bar,即便判斷為缺乏立場(lacking standing),"Click-To-Call"案所指time bar已然成立。
(字面上關於served with a complaint建立的time bar,沒有例外)
也就是說,即便是沒有立場的訴狀,仍產生了對於時間限制的效力,畢竟後續的IPR程序仍是基於這個不成立的訴訟。
POP的意見:
"We agree with, and follow, the Federal Circuit’s decision that “served with a complaint alleging infringement” in § 315(b) is plain and unambiguous, and means “presented with a complaint or delivered a complaint in a manner prescribed by law.”"
因此,GoPro對系爭專利提起IPR異議時已經超過前述360Heros提起訴訟後超過一年,POP要求PTAB作出拒絕啟始的決定。
my two cents:
以上兩個事件串起來,成為一個很特別的議題,也就是,提出侵權告訴時,專利權人竟然還未取得專利授權(發明人並未正式簽署讓渡書),因此訴訟被撤銷,但侵權被告提起IPR的時間又超過這個沒有成立的訴訟提告時間的法定時間(一年),經過專利權人主張違反35 U.S.C. § 315(b),後者也被撤銷。
提起IPR的時機顯然是嚴肅的程序問題,即便最初訴訟不成立或缺乏立場,仍有效地建立了time bar。
另外,本案中,PTAB/POP委員走在比較安全的線上,如果作出強加於法律表面文字上的許多解釋,可能有超越職權的問題,例如何謂"compliant",是否是成功地受理才算,還是沒有立場問題才算?這就有完沒完,因此,法律文字本身,字面上的意思,勝於額外強加的許多解釋。
PTAB決定:
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., Case IPR2018-01754 POP decision.pdf
(備份:https://app.box.com/s/a4eqoqnmdsdijx0bq5xc6qkx44zzr091)
資料參考:
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/08/precedent-infringement-patentee.html
Ron
2019年8月21日 星期三
MPEP 2111.03轉接詞筆記(about claims)
筆記
updated on Aug. 27, 2019,transitional phrase是否可翻為「轉接詞」?或是我國審查基準所指為「連接詞」,可能後者比較好,不影響本文原意,但仍在此說明!
本篇筆記MPEP 2111.03中轉接詞(transitional phrases):
其他相關參考:
[MPEP 2111.03 (Transitional Phrases)]
The transitional phrases “comprising”, “consisting essentially of” and “consisting of” define the scope of a claim with respect to what unrecited additional components or steps, if any, are excluded from the scope of the claim. The determination of what is or is not excluded by a transitional phrase must be made on a case-by-case basis in light of the facts of each case.
I. COMPRISING
The transitional term “comprising”, which is synonymous with “including,” “containing,” or “characterized by,” is inclusive or open-ended and does not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps. See, e.g., Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1376, 71 USPQ2d 1837, 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[L]ike the term ‘comprising,’ the terms ‘containing’ and ‘mixture’ are open-ended.”). Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1368, 66 USPQ2d 1631, 1634 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The transition ‘comprising’ in a method claim indicates that the claim is open-ended and allows for additional steps.”); Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501, 42 USPQ2d 1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Comprising” is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.); Moleculon Research Corp.v.CBS, Inc.,793 F.2d 1261, 229 USPQ 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686, 210 USPQ 795, 803 (CCPA 1981); Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948) (“comprising” leaves “the claim open for the inclusion of unspecified ingredients even in major amounts”). In Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1371-73, 74 USPQ2d 1586, 1589-91 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the court held that a claim to “a safety razor blade unit comprising a guard, a cap, and a group of first, second, and third blades” encompasses razors with more than three blades because the transitional phrase “comprising” in the preamble and the phrase “group of” are presumptively open-ended. “The word ‘comprising’ transitioning from the preamble to the body signals that the entire claim is presumptively open-ended.” Id. In contrast, the court noted the phrase “group consisting of” is a closed term, which is often used in claim drafting to signal a “Markush group” that is by its nature closed. Id. The court also emphasized that reference to “first,” “second,” and “third” blades in the claim was not used to show a serial or numerical limitation but instead was used to distinguish or identify the various members of the group. Id.
II. CONSISTING OF
The transitional phrase “consisting of” excludes any element, step, or ingredient not specified in the claim. In re Gray, 53 F.2d 520, 11 USPQ 255 (CCPA 1931); Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948) (“consisting of” defined as “closing the claim to the inclusion of materials other than those recited except for impurities ordinarily associated therewith”). But see Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1331-32, 70 USPQ2d 1508, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a bone repair kit "consisting of" claimed chemicals was infringed by a bone repair kit including a spatula in addition to the claimed chemicals because the presence of the spatula was unrelated to the claimed invention). A claim which depends from a claim which “consists of” the recited elements or steps cannot add an element or step.
When the phrase “consists of” appears in a clause of the body of a claim, rather than immediately following the preamble, there is an “exceptionally strong presumption that a claim term set off with ‘consisting of’ is closed to unrecited elements.” Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1359, 119 USPQ2d 1773, 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a layer “selected from the group consisting of” specific resins is closed to resins other than those listed). However, the “consisting of” phrase limits only the element set forth in that clause; other elements are not excluded from the claim as a whole. Mannesmann Demag Corp.v.Engineered Metal Products Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 230 USPQ 45 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 73 USPQ2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (The claims at issue “related to purified DNA molecules having promoter activity for the human involucrin gene (hINV).” Id., 73 USPQ2d at 1365. In determining the scope of applicant’s claims directed to “a purified oligonucleotide comprising at least a portion of the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 wherein said portion consists of the nucleotide sequence from … to 2473 of SEQ ID NO:1, and wherein said portion of the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 has promoter activity,” the court stated that the use of “consists” in the body of the claims did not limit the open-ended “comprising” language in the claims (emphases added). Id. at 1257, 73 USPQ2d at 1367. The court held that the claimed promoter sequence designated as SEQ ID NO:1 was obtained by sequencing the same prior art plasmid and was therefore anticipated by the prior art plasmid which necessarily possessed the same DNA sequence as the claimed oligonucleotides. Id. at 1256 and 1259, 73 USPQ2d at 1366 and 1369. The court affirmed the Board’s interpretation that the transition phrase “consists” did not limit the claims to only the recited numbered nucleotide sequences of SEQ ID NO:1 and that “the transition language ‘comprising’ allowed the claims to cover the entire involucrin gene plus other portions of the plasmid, as long as the gene contained the specific portions of SEQ ID NO:1 recited by the claim[s].” Id. at 1256, 73 USPQ2d at 1366.).
A claim element defined by selection from a group of alternatives (a Markush grouping; see MPEP § 2117 and § 2173.05(h)) requires selection from a closed group “consisting of” (rather than “comprising” or “including”) the alternative members. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280, 67 USPQ2d 1191, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 2003). If the claim element is intended to encompass combinations or mixtures of the alternatives set forth in the Markush grouping, the claim may include qualifying language preceding the recited alternatives (such as “at least one member” selected from the group), or within the list of alternatives (such as “or mixtures thereof”). Id. In the absence of such qualifying language there is a presumption that the Markush group is closed to combinations or mixtures. See Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1363-64, 119 USPQ2d 1773, 1784-85 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (presumption that Markush grouping does not encompass mixtures of listed resins overcome by intrinsic evidence in a dependent claim and the specification).
III. CONSISTING ESSENTIALLY OF
The transitional phrase “consisting essentially of” limits the scope of a claim to the specified materials or steps “and those that do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristic(s)” of the claimed invention. In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52, 190 USPQ 461, 463 (CCPA 1976) (emphasis in original) (Prior art hydraulic fluid required a dispersant which appellants argued was excluded from claims limited to a functional fluid “consisting essentially of” certain components. In finding the claims did not exclude the prior art dispersant, the court noted that appellants’ specification indicated the claimed composition can contain any well-known additive such as a dispersant, and there was no evidence that the presence of a dispersant would materially affect the basic and novel characteristic of the claimed invention. The prior art composition had the same basic and novel characteristic (increased oxidation resistance) as well as additional enhanced detergent and dispersant characteristics.). “A ‘consisting essentially of’ claim occupies a middle ground between closed claims that are written in a ‘consisting of’ format and fully open claims that are drafted in a ‘comprising’ format.” PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 1354, 48 USPQ2d 1351, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also Atlas Powder v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 224 USPQ 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 137 USPQ 893 (CCPA 1963); Water Technologies Corp. vs. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 7 USPQ2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For the purposes of searching for and applying prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, absent a clear indication in the specification or claims of what the basic and novel characteristics actually are, “consisting essentially of” will be construed as equivalent to “comprising.” See, e.g., PPG, 156 F.3d at 1355, 48 USPQ2d at 1355 (“PPG could have defined the scope of the phrase ‘consisting essentially of’ for purposes of its patent by making clear in its specification what it regarded as constituting a material change in the basic and novel characteristics of the invention.”). See also AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1240-41, 68 USPQ2d 1280, 1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Applicant’s statement in the specification that “silicon contents in the coating metal should not exceed about 0.5% by weight” along with a discussion of the deleterious effects of silicon provided basis to conclude that silicon in excess of 0.5% by weight would materially alter the basic and novel properties of the invention. Thus, “consisting essentially of” as recited in the preamble was interpreted to permit no more than 0.5% by weight of silicon in the aluminum coating.); In re Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 954, 137 USPQ 893, 895-96 (CCPA 1963). If an applicant contends that additional steps or materials in the prior art are excluded by the recitation of “consisting essentially of,” applicant has the burden of showing that the introduction of additional steps or components would materially change the characteristics of applicant’s invention. In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964). See also Ex parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061, 1063-64 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989) (“Although ‘consisting essentially of’ is typically used and defined in the context of compositions of matter, we find nothing intrinsically wrong with the use of such language as a modifier of method steps. . . [rendering] the claim open only for the inclusion of steps which do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed method. To determine the steps included versus excluded the claim must be read in light of the specification. . . . [I]t is an applicant’s burden to establish that a step practiced in a prior art method is excluded from his claims by ‘consisting essentially of’ language.”).
IV. OTHER TRANSITIONAL PHRASES
Transitional phrases such as “having” must be interpreted in light of the specification to determine whether open or closed claim language is intended. See, e.g., Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 1376, 56 USPQ2d 1445, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (interpreting the term “having” as open terminology, allowing the inclusion of other components in addition to those recited); Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1348, 57 USPQ2d 1953, 1959 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (term “having” in transitional phrase “does not create a presumption that the body of the claim is open”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1573, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (in the context of a cDNA having a sequence coding for human PI, the term “having” still permitted inclusion of other moieties). The transitional phrase “composed of” has been interpreted in the same manner as either “consisting of” or “consisting essentially of,” depending on the facts of the particular case. See AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company, 239 F.3d 1239, 1245, 57 USPQ2d 1776, 1780-81 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (based on specification and other evidence, “composed of” interpreted in same manner as “consisting essentially of”); In re Bertsch, 132 F.2d 1014, 1019-20, 56 USPQ 379, 384 (CCPA 1942) (“Composed of” interpreted in same manner as “consisting of”; however, the court further remarked that “the words ‘composed of’ may under certain circumstances be given, in patent law, a broader meaning than ‘consisting of.’”).
updated on Aug. 27, 2019,transitional phrase是否可翻為「轉接詞」?或是我國審查基準所指為「連接詞」,可能後者比較好,不影響本文原意,但仍在此說明!
本篇筆記MPEP 2111.03中轉接詞(transitional phrases):
- 轉接詞「comprising」、「consisting essentially of」、「consisting of」用以定義申請專利範圍是否「排除」了未被納入的元件或步驟。
- 然而,專利範圍是否「排除」未被納入的元件,是"case-by-case",根據事實就事論事。
- 「COMPRISING」同義於"including"、"containing"或是"characterized by",為開放式(open-ended)轉接詞,並不會排除額外未描述在申請專利範圍中的元件或步驟。
- 法院指出用語「group consisting of」為封閉式轉接詞,如“Markush group”(常見於化學案的選擇式寫法),本質為封閉式轉接詞。
- 法院強調使用「“first,” “second,” and “third”」不是用來表示序號或是數值上的限制,而是用來區分或辨明多種元件("“first,” “second,” and “third” blades in the claim was not used to show a serial or numerical limitation but instead was used to distinguish or identify the various members of the group.")
- 「CONSISTING OF」用於「排除」未列在申請專利範圍中的元件、步驟或成份。
- 若使用「consists of」在申請專利範圍本文(body),而不是前言的尾句,這是一個強烈的表達,"consisting of"是個排除其他元件的封閉式轉接詞(“exceptionally strong presumption that a claim term set off with ‘consisting of’ is closed to unrecited elements.”)
- In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 73 USPQ2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(這是有關DNA序列的案件,法院表示使用在申請專利範圍的本文(body)使用「consists」,並未限制前言部分使用開放式轉接詞「comprising」的效果)
- 申請專利範圍中使用「Markush」選擇式寫法,提供選擇的群組應使用封閉式轉接詞「consisting of」,不能使用「comprising」或是「including」。
- (一點點開放的寫法)Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280, 67 USPQ2d 1191, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(如果申請專利範圍元件為一些選擇元件的混合,請求項可以使用在此群組內選擇「至少一個元件(at least one member)」或「其混合(or mixtures thereof)」的寫法。
- 「CONSISTING ESSENTIALLY OF」顯示申請專利範圍到特定材料或步驟,以及其他不會實質影響其發明基礎與新穎特徵的元件
- In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52, 190 USPQ 461, 463 (CCPA 1976)(法院指出使用"consisting essentially of"轉接詞,可以包括先前技術中已知元件,而證據顯示這些先前已知元件不會影像專利的新穎特徵,這是個半封閉、半開放的轉接詞。
- 若說明書並未明確指示發明中的新穎特徵,「consisting essentially of」將解釋為開放式轉接詞。
- AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1240-41, 68 USPQ2d 1280, 1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (說明書描述了成份與範圍,使得使用在申請專利範圍前言的「consisting essentially of」中的範圍將被限定在說明書的成份與範圍中)。
- 使用了「consisting essentially of」轉接詞的專利範圍,如果專利申請人答辯時強調發明排除了先前技術中的步驟或材料,應舉證證明先前技術的元件為實質影像專利範圍的特徵。
- 使用「consisting essentially of」專利範圍的解釋應用內部證據,若要排除前案,就要舉證。
- 使用「having」轉接詞的專利範圍應參照專利說明書來判斷是封閉式或是開放式轉接詞。
- Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 1376, 56 USPQ2d 1445, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2000)(解釋「having」為開放式轉接詞,將允許包括其他未描述在專利範圍中的元件)
- Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1348, 57 USPQ2d 1953, 1959 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(使用「having」並未建立申請專利範圍為開放的推定)
- Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1573, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(根據前後文,「having」轉接詞仍允許涵蓋其他特徵)
- 「composed of」轉接詞解釋如同「consisting of」或是「consisting essentially of」,要依照事實認定。
- AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company, 239 F.3d 1239, 1245, 57 USPQ2d 1776, 1780-81 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(根據說明書與其他證據,「composed of」解釋為「consisting essentially of」)。
- In re Bertsch, 132 F.2d 1014, 1019-20, 56 USPQ 379, 384 (CCPA 1942)(「Composed of」解釋如同「consisting of」,但法院表示「composed of」仍看情況而定,其意義大於「consisting of」)。
-------------------------------
- MPEP 2111.03列舉案例:
- Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1376, 71 USPQ2d 1837, 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(有關開放式轉接詞)
- Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1368, 66 USPQ2d 1631, 1634 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(有關‘comprising’包括額外未描述的元件)
- Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501, 42 USPQ2d 1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(使用“Comprising”表示納入的元件為重要,但不排除其他元件)
- Moleculon Research Corp.v.CBS, Inc.,793 F.2d 1261, 229 USPQ 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
- In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686, 210 USPQ 795, 803 (CCPA 1981);
- Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948)(關於“comprising”為開放式轉接詞,涵蓋未指定成份)
- In Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1371-73, 74 USPQ2d 1586, 1589-91 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(前言中“comprising”以及“group of”用語為開放式推定)
- In re Gray, 53 F.2d 520, 11 USPQ 255 (CCPA 1931); Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948)(“consisting of”定義為封閉而排除其他未列舉元件,但通常關聯的雜質除外)
- Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1331-32, 70 USPQ2d 1508, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 2004)("consisting of"所主張的化學製品被侵權,侵權物也涵蓋了一些額外元件,因為這些元件與發明無關)
- Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1359, 119 USPQ2d 1773, 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2016)(選擇式寫法“selected from the group consisting of”為封閉式轉接詞,不適用未列舉元件)
- Mannesmann Demag Corp.v.Engineered Metal Products Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 230 USPQ 45 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
- In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 73 USPQ2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(這是有關DNA序列的案件,法院表示使用在申請專利範圍的本文(body)使用「consists」,並未限制前言部分使用開放式轉接詞「comprising」的效果)
- (一點點開放的寫法)Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280, 67 USPQ2d 1191, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(如果申請專利範圍元件為一些選擇元件的混合,請求項可以使用在此群組內選擇「至少一個元件(at least one member)」或「其混合(or mixtures thereof)」的寫法。
- Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1363-64, 119 USPQ2d 1773, 1784-85 (Fed. Cir. 2016)(「Markush grouping」寫法推定不能涵蓋內部證據(說明書)與附屬項的混合物("does not encompass mixtures of listed resins overcome by intrinsic evidence in a dependent claim and the specification")。
- In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52, 190 USPQ 461, 463 (CCPA 1976)(法院指出使用"consisting essentially of"轉接詞,可以包括先前技術中已知元件,而證據顯示這些先前已知元件不會影像專利的新穎特徵,這是個半封閉、半開放的轉接詞。
- PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 1354, 48 USPQ2d 1351, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
- Atlas Powder v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 224 USPQ 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
- In re Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 137 USPQ 893 (CCPA 1963)
- Water Technologies Corp. vs. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 7 USPQ2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
- AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1240-41, 68 USPQ2d 1280, 1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (說明書描述了成份與範圍,使得使用在申請專利範圍前言的「consisting essentially of」中的範圍將被限定在說明書的成份與範圍中)。
- In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964)
- Ex parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061, 1063-64 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989)
- Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 1376, 56 USPQ2d 1445, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2000)(解釋「having」為開放式轉接詞,將允許包括其他未描述在專利範圍中的元件)
- Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1348, 57 USPQ2d 1953, 1959 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(使用「having」並未建立申請專利範圍為開放的推定)
- Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1573, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(根據前後文,「having」轉接詞仍允許涵蓋其他特徵)
- 「composed of」轉接詞解釋如同「consisting of」或是「consisting essentially of」,要依照事實認定。
- AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company, 239 F.3d 1239, 1245, 57 USPQ2d 1776, 1780-81 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(根據說明書與其他證據,「composed of」解釋為「consisting essentially of」)。
- In re Bertsch, 132 F.2d 1014, 1019-20, 56 USPQ 379, 384 (CCPA 1942)(「Composed of」解釋如同「consisting of」,但法院表示「composed of」仍看情況而定,其意義大於「consisting of」)。
其他相關參考:
- 副詞子句的效力(特別包括附帶條件的專利範圍討論) - MPEP 2111.04(https://enpan.blogspot.com/2019/04/mpep-211104.html)
- 連接副詞的效力 - MPEP 2111.04(https://enpan.blogspot.com/2017/05/mpep-211104.html)
- 封閉式連接詞影響侵權主張 - Shire Development v. Watson Pharma (Fed. Cir. 2017)(https://enpan.blogspot.com/2017/02/shire-development-v-watson-pharma-fed.html)
[MPEP 2111.03 (Transitional Phrases)]
The transitional phrases “comprising”, “consisting essentially of” and “consisting of” define the scope of a claim with respect to what unrecited additional components or steps, if any, are excluded from the scope of the claim. The determination of what is or is not excluded by a transitional phrase must be made on a case-by-case basis in light of the facts of each case.
I. COMPRISING
The transitional term “comprising”, which is synonymous with “including,” “containing,” or “characterized by,” is inclusive or open-ended and does not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps. See, e.g., Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1376, 71 USPQ2d 1837, 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[L]ike the term ‘comprising,’ the terms ‘containing’ and ‘mixture’ are open-ended.”). Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1368, 66 USPQ2d 1631, 1634 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The transition ‘comprising’ in a method claim indicates that the claim is open-ended and allows for additional steps.”); Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501, 42 USPQ2d 1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Comprising” is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.); Moleculon Research Corp.v.CBS, Inc.,793 F.2d 1261, 229 USPQ 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686, 210 USPQ 795, 803 (CCPA 1981); Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948) (“comprising” leaves “the claim open for the inclusion of unspecified ingredients even in major amounts”). In Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1371-73, 74 USPQ2d 1586, 1589-91 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the court held that a claim to “a safety razor blade unit comprising a guard, a cap, and a group of first, second, and third blades” encompasses razors with more than three blades because the transitional phrase “comprising” in the preamble and the phrase “group of” are presumptively open-ended. “The word ‘comprising’ transitioning from the preamble to the body signals that the entire claim is presumptively open-ended.” Id. In contrast, the court noted the phrase “group consisting of” is a closed term, which is often used in claim drafting to signal a “Markush group” that is by its nature closed. Id. The court also emphasized that reference to “first,” “second,” and “third” blades in the claim was not used to show a serial or numerical limitation but instead was used to distinguish or identify the various members of the group. Id.
II. CONSISTING OF
The transitional phrase “consisting of” excludes any element, step, or ingredient not specified in the claim. In re Gray, 53 F.2d 520, 11 USPQ 255 (CCPA 1931); Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948) (“consisting of” defined as “closing the claim to the inclusion of materials other than those recited except for impurities ordinarily associated therewith”). But see Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1331-32, 70 USPQ2d 1508, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a bone repair kit "consisting of" claimed chemicals was infringed by a bone repair kit including a spatula in addition to the claimed chemicals because the presence of the spatula was unrelated to the claimed invention). A claim which depends from a claim which “consists of” the recited elements or steps cannot add an element or step.
When the phrase “consists of” appears in a clause of the body of a claim, rather than immediately following the preamble, there is an “exceptionally strong presumption that a claim term set off with ‘consisting of’ is closed to unrecited elements.” Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1359, 119 USPQ2d 1773, 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a layer “selected from the group consisting of” specific resins is closed to resins other than those listed). However, the “consisting of” phrase limits only the element set forth in that clause; other elements are not excluded from the claim as a whole. Mannesmann Demag Corp.v.Engineered Metal Products Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 230 USPQ 45 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 73 USPQ2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (The claims at issue “related to purified DNA molecules having promoter activity for the human involucrin gene (hINV).” Id., 73 USPQ2d at 1365. In determining the scope of applicant’s claims directed to “a purified oligonucleotide comprising at least a portion of the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 wherein said portion consists of the nucleotide sequence from … to 2473 of SEQ ID NO:1, and wherein said portion of the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 has promoter activity,” the court stated that the use of “consists” in the body of the claims did not limit the open-ended “comprising” language in the claims (emphases added). Id. at 1257, 73 USPQ2d at 1367. The court held that the claimed promoter sequence designated as SEQ ID NO:1 was obtained by sequencing the same prior art plasmid and was therefore anticipated by the prior art plasmid which necessarily possessed the same DNA sequence as the claimed oligonucleotides. Id. at 1256 and 1259, 73 USPQ2d at 1366 and 1369. The court affirmed the Board’s interpretation that the transition phrase “consists” did not limit the claims to only the recited numbered nucleotide sequences of SEQ ID NO:1 and that “the transition language ‘comprising’ allowed the claims to cover the entire involucrin gene plus other portions of the plasmid, as long as the gene contained the specific portions of SEQ ID NO:1 recited by the claim[s].” Id. at 1256, 73 USPQ2d at 1366.).
A claim element defined by selection from a group of alternatives (a Markush grouping; see MPEP § 2117 and § 2173.05(h)) requires selection from a closed group “consisting of” (rather than “comprising” or “including”) the alternative members. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280, 67 USPQ2d 1191, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 2003). If the claim element is intended to encompass combinations or mixtures of the alternatives set forth in the Markush grouping, the claim may include qualifying language preceding the recited alternatives (such as “at least one member” selected from the group), or within the list of alternatives (such as “or mixtures thereof”). Id. In the absence of such qualifying language there is a presumption that the Markush group is closed to combinations or mixtures. See Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1363-64, 119 USPQ2d 1773, 1784-85 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (presumption that Markush grouping does not encompass mixtures of listed resins overcome by intrinsic evidence in a dependent claim and the specification).
III. CONSISTING ESSENTIALLY OF
The transitional phrase “consisting essentially of” limits the scope of a claim to the specified materials or steps “and those that do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristic(s)” of the claimed invention. In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52, 190 USPQ 461, 463 (CCPA 1976) (emphasis in original) (Prior art hydraulic fluid required a dispersant which appellants argued was excluded from claims limited to a functional fluid “consisting essentially of” certain components. In finding the claims did not exclude the prior art dispersant, the court noted that appellants’ specification indicated the claimed composition can contain any well-known additive such as a dispersant, and there was no evidence that the presence of a dispersant would materially affect the basic and novel characteristic of the claimed invention. The prior art composition had the same basic and novel characteristic (increased oxidation resistance) as well as additional enhanced detergent and dispersant characteristics.). “A ‘consisting essentially of’ claim occupies a middle ground between closed claims that are written in a ‘consisting of’ format and fully open claims that are drafted in a ‘comprising’ format.” PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 1354, 48 USPQ2d 1351, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also Atlas Powder v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 224 USPQ 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 137 USPQ 893 (CCPA 1963); Water Technologies Corp. vs. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 7 USPQ2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For the purposes of searching for and applying prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, absent a clear indication in the specification or claims of what the basic and novel characteristics actually are, “consisting essentially of” will be construed as equivalent to “comprising.” See, e.g., PPG, 156 F.3d at 1355, 48 USPQ2d at 1355 (“PPG could have defined the scope of the phrase ‘consisting essentially of’ for purposes of its patent by making clear in its specification what it regarded as constituting a material change in the basic and novel characteristics of the invention.”). See also AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1240-41, 68 USPQ2d 1280, 1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Applicant’s statement in the specification that “silicon contents in the coating metal should not exceed about 0.5% by weight” along with a discussion of the deleterious effects of silicon provided basis to conclude that silicon in excess of 0.5% by weight would materially alter the basic and novel properties of the invention. Thus, “consisting essentially of” as recited in the preamble was interpreted to permit no more than 0.5% by weight of silicon in the aluminum coating.); In re Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 954, 137 USPQ 893, 895-96 (CCPA 1963). If an applicant contends that additional steps or materials in the prior art are excluded by the recitation of “consisting essentially of,” applicant has the burden of showing that the introduction of additional steps or components would materially change the characteristics of applicant’s invention. In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964). See also Ex parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061, 1063-64 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989) (“Although ‘consisting essentially of’ is typically used and defined in the context of compositions of matter, we find nothing intrinsically wrong with the use of such language as a modifier of method steps. . . [rendering] the claim open only for the inclusion of steps which do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed method. To determine the steps included versus excluded the claim must be read in light of the specification. . . . [I]t is an applicant’s burden to establish that a step practiced in a prior art method is excluded from his claims by ‘consisting essentially of’ language.”).
IV. OTHER TRANSITIONAL PHRASES
Transitional phrases such as “having” must be interpreted in light of the specification to determine whether open or closed claim language is intended. See, e.g., Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 1376, 56 USPQ2d 1445, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (interpreting the term “having” as open terminology, allowing the inclusion of other components in addition to those recited); Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1348, 57 USPQ2d 1953, 1959 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (term “having” in transitional phrase “does not create a presumption that the body of the claim is open”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1573, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (in the context of a cDNA having a sequence coding for human PI, the term “having” still permitted inclusion of other moieties). The transitional phrase “composed of” has been interpreted in the same manner as either “consisting of” or “consisting essentially of,” depending on the facts of the particular case. See AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company, 239 F.3d 1239, 1245, 57 USPQ2d 1776, 1780-81 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (based on specification and other evidence, “composed of” interpreted in same manner as “consisting essentially of”); In re Bertsch, 132 F.2d 1014, 1019-20, 56 USPQ 379, 384 (CCPA 1942) (“Composed of” interpreted in same manner as “consisting of”; however, the court further remarked that “the words ‘composed of’ may under certain circumstances be given, in patent law, a broader meaning than ‘consisting of.’”).
Ron
2019年8月20日 星期二
違反法院雇員規定 - In Re Violation of Rule 50
本次判決關於Federal Circuit Rule 50規定法院員工不能參與或協助正在進行的訴訟,特別是規範「離職員工(包括約聘人員、實習人員)」不能參與或協助(代理、諮詢)在「受雇期間」還在進行的訴訟,也就是離開法院的工作後,仍不能參與受雇期間正在進行而離職後還在進行的訴訟。
這件事對法律事務所而言十分重要。
(http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-of-practice/MASTERFederalCircuitRulesOfPractice-10.2.2017.pdf)
本次判決關於「一位法院離職員工」違反Federal Circuit Rule 50的案件,這位離職員工離開法院後到了一家時常參與訴訟的私人法律事務所,這位法院前員工離職時收到一張列舉她受雇於法院時正在進行的訴訟的「清單」,讓此離職員工可以交付給將來要工作的事務所。
在此案例/故事中,時間點是這位「法院離職員工」離職後一年後,CAFC法院對某一上訴案件發出一個「撤銷訴訟」決定,而且是在此離職員工離開法院之前一短暫時間才建檔,CAFC判決發回地方法院重審!(這時尚與此員工受雇的事務所無關)
(僱用法院離職員工的事務所開始參與訴訟)
當案件發回地院重審時,這家僱用此離職員工的法律事務所開始代理此訴訟的某一方(這時這位法院前員工其實已經離職幾年),法律事務所宣稱該員工並沒有立即參與此案,並且當發現此案開始自在她還在法院工作時,立即停止相關事務,甚至也通知法院這件事,因此並未違反Rule 50的義務。
雖然法律事務所宣稱這件事並非故意,而且此案是在此法院離職員工離職前一短時間才建檔,她完全不曉得此案件任何細節,且將來不會發生(顯然事務所很緊張,可能因此敗訴或需要賠償當事人)。
調查報告:
法院十分嚴格地遵守此聯邦法院規則,此案例中,這位法院前員工確實在受雇此法律事務所交付上述受雇法院期間的訴訟清單(可能是落落長),法律事務所承接案件時卻怠忽了。
然而,情、理、法,法院仍釋出善意,因為這件事務所為初犯,明確地並未因為這個違例影響訴訟,且此法院前員工在法院期間未與此案例有關,且法律事務所發現此事時,已經適當地告知法院,但仍藉此案例告誡法律事務所在訴訟前有義務要確認是否案件曾經在任一員工在法院工作時已經進行著。
my two cents:
這樣看來,這篇「有體諒、又嚴厲」的意見(不是法官寫的,而是一個調查報告)確實告誡了參與訴訟的事務所,在代理訴訟前還需要身家調查協助案件的所有人員,查看這些人員有沒有在此訴訟進行時曾經在法院工作的人?
判決文:
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-9001_Rule_50_Violation_9.27.18.pdf
這件事對法律事務所而言十分重要。
(http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-of-practice/MASTERFederalCircuitRulesOfPractice-10.2.2017.pdf)
本次判決關於「一位法院離職員工」違反Federal Circuit Rule 50的案件,這位離職員工離開法院後到了一家時常參與訴訟的私人法律事務所,這位法院前員工離職時收到一張列舉她受雇於法院時正在進行的訴訟的「清單」,讓此離職員工可以交付給將來要工作的事務所。
在此案例/故事中,時間點是這位「法院離職員工」離職後一年後,CAFC法院對某一上訴案件發出一個「撤銷訴訟」決定,而且是在此離職員工離開法院之前一短暫時間才建檔,CAFC判決發回地方法院重審!(這時尚與此員工受雇的事務所無關)
(僱用法院離職員工的事務所開始參與訴訟)
當案件發回地院重審時,這家僱用此離職員工的法律事務所開始代理此訴訟的某一方(這時這位法院前員工其實已經離職幾年),法律事務所宣稱該員工並沒有立即參與此案,並且當發現此案開始自在她還在法院工作時,立即停止相關事務,甚至也通知法院這件事,因此並未違反Rule 50的義務。
雖然法律事務所宣稱這件事並非故意,而且此案是在此法院離職員工離職前一短時間才建檔,她完全不曉得此案件任何細節,且將來不會發生(顯然事務所很緊張,可能因此敗訴或需要賠償當事人)。
調查報告:
法院十分嚴格地遵守此聯邦法院規則,此案例中,這位法院前員工確實在受雇此法律事務所交付上述受雇法院期間的訴訟清單(可能是落落長),法律事務所承接案件時卻怠忽了。
然而,情、理、法,法院仍釋出善意,因為這件事務所為初犯,明確地並未因為這個違例影響訴訟,且此法院前員工在法院期間未與此案例有關,且法律事務所發現此事時,已經適當地告知法院,但仍藉此案例告誡法律事務所在訴訟前有義務要確認是否案件曾經在任一員工在法院工作時已經進行著。
my two cents:
這樣看來,這篇「有體諒、又嚴厲」的意見(不是法官寫的,而是一個調查報告)確實告誡了參與訴訟的事務所,在代理訴訟前還需要身家調查協助案件的所有人員,查看這些人員有沒有在此訴訟進行時曾經在法院工作的人?
判決文:
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-9001_Rule_50_Violation_9.27.18.pdf
資料參考:
Ron
2019年8月15日 星期四
網頁廣告並不能證明商業使用 - In re Siny Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
網頁廣告並不能證明商業使用 - In re Siny Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
上訴人:IN RE: SINY CORP.
系爭商標:
CASALANA(Class 24)
(Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No. 86754400)
本案緣起商標申請人Siny Corp.對美國TTAB(Trademark Trial Appeal Board)拒絕商標申請案的決定提出上訴,TTAB拒絕商標申請的理由是:沒有適當的證據證明商標的商業使用。
Trademark Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
"A mark is in use in commerce on goods when:
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, …"
其中,商標申請人Siny用網頁證明商業使用「CASALANA」,網頁也說明了商品的內容。
TTAB認為,商標申請人提出的商業使用證明是「廣告」,相關樣品也不代表商品訂購,不足以證明相關產品已經有商業使用。
CAFC判決文中節錄網頁畫面:
商標申請人主張網頁上的樣品包括了商品銷售的意思,甚至還有「For Sales Information」的用字。
TTAB認為,網頁上的文字本身不足以讓消費者購買,僅表示了消費者可以藉此得到更多購買商品的資訊,若是訂購資訊,應包括數量、價格與付款選項("the cited text alone was insufficient for consumers to make a purchase; rather, it only indicated how consumers could obtain more information necessary to make a purchase.")
TTAB接著表示,(重要)要證明商標的商業使用,應該是商標標誌用在商品、包裝、連結商品的呈現或其標籤上。
(重要)也就是TTAB認為網頁上的資訊僅是「廣告」,不是販售(商業使用)資訊,而銷售據點上的標誌就是了。
(重要)進一步地,TTAB判斷「網頁」是不是一個「銷售據點」?如果需要靠外部方法(如打電話)得到銷售細節(價格、數量、訂購方法),網頁上的資訊就是廣告,不會是「銷售據點」。
"while some details must be worked out by telephone, if virtually all important aspects of the transaction must be deter-mined from information extraneous to the web page, then the web page is not a point of sale."
案件上訴CAFC。
商標標誌的商業使用應為用在商品、包裝、標籤,或是"連結商品的呈現"("display associated with the goods")上。
那「網頁」算不算一種連結商品的呈現("display associated with the goods")?
(重要)答案是,如果僅是商品以外的「廣告」或是「文件」,就不是連結商品的呈現,就不能證明商業使用。(“[I]t [is] well settled that mere advertising and documentary use of a notation apart from the goods do not constitute technical trademark use.”)
是否「樣品」符合商品的連結呈現?
(重要)答案是,如果這個呈現是在銷售據點,就是了!("one important consideration is whether the display is at a point-of-sale location.")
(重要)以上幾個判斷都是要實際的證據來證明。
因此,網頁上的樣品僅是廣告,或是商品的連結呈現,就看證據吧!
[相關法條]
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)
(a) Application for use of trademark
(1) The owner of a trademark used in commerce may request registration of its trademark on the principal register hereby established by paying the prescribed fee and filing in the Patent and Trademark Office an application and a verified statement, in such form as may be prescribed by the Director, and such number of specimens or facsimiles of the mark as used as may be required by the Director.
(2) The application shall include specification of the applicant's domicile and citizenship, the date of the applicant's first use of the mark, the date of the applicant's first use of the mark in commerce, the goods in connection with which the mark is used, and a drawing of the mark.
(3) The statement shall be verified by the applicant and specify that--
(A) the person making the verification believes that he or she, or the juristic person in whose behalf he or she makes the verification, to be the owner of the mark sought to be registered;
(B) to the best of the verifier's knowledge and belief, the facts recited in the application are accurate;
(C) the mark is in use in commerce; and
(D) to the best of the verifier's knowledge and belief, no other person has the right to use such mark in commerce either in the identical form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of such other person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, except that, in the case of every application claiming concurrent use, the applicant shall--
(i) state exceptions to the claim of exclusive use; and
(ii) shall 1 specify, to the extent of the verifier's knowledge--
(I) any concurrent use by others;
(II) the goods on or in connection with which and the areas in which each concurrent use exists;
(III) the periods of each use; and
(IV) the goods and area for which the applicant desires registration.
(4) The applicant shall comply with such rules or regulations as may be prescribed by the Director. The Director shall promulgate rules prescribing the requirements for the application and for obtaining a filing date herein.
my two cents:
雖仍有反對意見(主張網頁上陳列樣品就是有效的銷售據點(point of sale)),但最好在商標申請案證明商業使用時,提出使用此商標的商品、價格、訂購/付款方法等證據。
判決文:
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/18-1077.Opinion.4-10-2019.pdf(備份:https://app.box.com/s/t3igusorf4t47vud053jtmxtyl0phr9l)
資料參考:
Ron
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