2018年1月30日 星期二

多數NPE侵權訴訟將移到Delaware

美國最高法院在2017年5月作出的判決TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group表示不能讓原告單方面決定侵權審判的法院,所涉及的議題是,管轄法院的決定到底是看被告居住地,還是事業所在地,或是侵權發生地,還是可以隨原告選擇?

最高法院判決:專利訴訟審理法院將可隨被告請求移到"居住地"/“企業據點",而不再讓原告指定/挑選法院。

相關報導:以企業據點決定管轄法院 - 美國最高法院TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Group Brands LLC決定(https://enpan.blogspot.tw/2017/05/tc-heartland-llc-v-kraft-food-group.html)。


這個案例將直接影響一般普遍認定偏好專利權人的「東德州地方法院(Eastern District Court of Texas)」。這篇文章描述到此件最高法院案例對東德州地方法院的影響:https://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/2017/09/22/meet-the-new-king-of-patent-litigation-sorry-east.html。另有參考文章:A Heaven for Patent Pirates(https://www.technologyreview.com/s/405259/a-haven-for-patent-pirates/)。

然而,TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group案則是涉及這個特別的訴訟地點:德拉瓦(Delaware),這裡也是有個比較偏好專利權人(泛指NPE, PAE, Patent Troll...)的法院 - 美國德拉瓦州地方法院(United States District Court for the District of Delaware),原因之一是,德拉瓦州是美國第二小的州,可以靠訴訟賺錢;另有原因是其法律程序(快)偏好專利權人,與東德州地方法院一樣,訴訟時程快、賠償金額高。

這回,如本篇主題,最高法院案例致使專利權人將訴訟移到德拉瓦州



(圖片來源:Google maps、街景)

本篇參考文章指出,在2005~2015年Texas Eastern為多數訴訟所在地(佔2/3),緊接著是Delaware(也達1/3),差了一倍。
(圖表來源:https://hbr.org/resources/images/article_assets/2017/06/W170619_COHEN_THEGEOGRAPHY-1024x387.png

如此,為何專利訴訟就會移出東德州而到了德拉瓦州?

理由有幾個,這個小州裡頭,應該是因為在稅賦上面提供的極佳的優惠,使得成為企業據點最佳所在上市公司中有64%在此成立,90%的首次公開在此發行(IPO),即便有上訴最高法院判決,公司移動不是那麼容易,Delaware將是一個看似有利NPE提起訴訟的地方。

當訴訟可能集中在某地時,為了確保訴訟品質,應該有個訴訟前過濾機制(如作者建議的prelitigation review board,強調訴訟費用應多數由原告負擔),避免濫用司法,也可阻礙不必要的訴訟。本篇文章最後也諷刺地說,要降低NPE興起的訴訟,不是只是改變NPE的地址(或說zip code)而已

[相關法條,也是TC Heartland案最高法院判決依據]

28 U.S. Code § 1400 - Patents and copyrights, mask works, and designs

(a)
Civil actions, suits, or proceedings arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights or exclusive rights in mask works or designs may be instituted in the district in which the defendant or his agent resides or may be found.
(b)

Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.

資料參考:
https://hbr.org/2017/06/patent-trolling-isnt-dead-its-just-moving-to-delaware
https://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/2017/09/22/meet-the-new-king-of-patent-litigation-sorry-east.html

Ron

2018年1月29日 星期一

所有權問題導致沒有訴訟立場 - Advanced Video Technologies v. HTC (Fed. Cir. 2018)

案件資訊:
原告/上訴人:ADVANCED VIDEO TECHNOLOGIES LLC
被告/被上訴人:HTC CORPORATION, HTC AMERICA, INC., BLACKBERRY LTD, BLACKBERRY CORPORATION, MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC
系爭專利:US5,781,788

這是一個侵權訴訟,在地院階段,地方法院認為原告Advanced Video並沒有立場(standing)提出侵權告訴,理由是專利的共同擁有者並未轉換權利給原告Advanced Video

"The district court based its decision on the ground that a co-owner of the patent was not a party to the actions, and the co-owner’s ownership interests in the patent were not transferred to Advanced Video."

系爭專利US5,781,788關於一種全雙工單影像片段編解碼器(Full duplex single clip video codec):


上訴議題僅一個,不是技術問題,是「是否專利共同擁有人/發明人已經在雇傭合約中轉換擁有權(ownership)給目前專利權人Advanced Video

"whether a co-inventor of the patent transferred her co-ownership interests in the patent under the terms of an employment agreement."

討論:
系爭專利'788的公報中列出三個發明人,也就是這件專利「co-inventors」,發明完成之時三位發明人皆為Infochips Systems Inc.(已倒閉)員工,但卻僅兩位簽署授讓書(assignment)將權利轉給Advanced Video,剩下的這位女士Vivian Hsiun變成本訴訟案"參加人"。


AVC宣稱已經取得Hsiun女士的"幾次"權利轉移,第一次1992年引用與雇主Infochips的雇傭合約;第二次為Infochips與Lease Management Services的財務合同;第三次1995年是Lease Management Services將Infochips資產賣給原始co-inventors之一的Mr. Woo;第四次1995年就是轉讓給AVC Technology Inc.  (AVC)

從判決書的理解,前三次交易是系爭專利的發明進行中,發明時間的雇傭關係與相關資產與權利轉移已經牽扯到專利權的歸屬,當發明到了AVC手中,1995年提出本次系爭專利'788的母案申請案,除了Hsiun女士以外的兩位發明人簽署授讓合約(assignment),Hsiun女士拒絕簽署。

發明人(inventorship)與所有權(ownership)在美國專利實務中是最重要資訊之一,但是如果專利申請時無法找到發明人簽名,或是被拒絕,仍有提出申請的方式。此案中,AVC宣稱在專利提出申請時,雇傭關係、財務文件都證明Mr. Woo與AVC都取得Hsiun女士的授權,PTO同意後獲准'788案專利(專利取得過程不在此探討,母案已拋棄)。

AVC之後解散,將資產轉給目前訴訟方Advanced Video

一點點資訊可以參考:如果找不到發明人簽名怎麼辦?(http://enpan.blogspot.tw/2009/01/blog-post_19.html

到了2011年,Advanced Video提出訴訟(三件),地方法院(Southern District of New York)發現根據當地法律,在上次權利移轉時,解散的AVC並未將專利權轉給Advanced Video,關鍵在Hsiun女士,即便Advanced Video提出證明證實Hsiun的授權與權利放棄的意願(“will assign” provision, trust provision, and quitclaim provision,仍判定Advanced Video沒有專利所有權,最後因為被判缺乏訴訟立場。



原告上訴CAFC。

“will assign” provision:
首先,即便提出Hsiun的雇傭合約中員工"授權意願",法院認為,雇傭合約的意願僅是授權的"承諾",不能表示「專利授讓的簽署」

"The court relied on Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Industries, Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991), which held that “will be assigned” language in a consulting agreement did not itself effect an assignment but was merely a promise to assign."

trust provision:
地方法院認為因為Hsiun在信託權利的同時並未立即在專利申請時簽署授讓權利,雇傭合約中的信託條款並不代表簽署授讓書(assignment)。

"The district court also reasoned that the trust provision of the Employee Agreement undermined an immediate assignment because Ms. Hsiun could not immediately assign the rights and at the same time hold them in trust."

quitclaim provision:
Advanced Video主張Hsiun與Infochips的雇傭合約中離職條款使得後續接手的人已經取得所有權。但法院認定雇傭合約並沒有提出可轉讓的約("assignable hereunder"),並未證明專利權可轉讓,不能代表真實的簽署(actually assign)。還有,當時Hsiun簽署雇傭合約中的"quitclaim"條款時並未有任何專利申請案,對後續在AVC或Advanced Video的專利授讓沒有關係。

CAFC判決:原告Advanced Video因為沒有完整的'788所有權,Hsiun也非訴訟一方,也沒有得到她的同意,失去訴訟立場。

"Advanced Video does not have full ownership of the ’788 patent. Ms. Hsiun is neither a party to the suits, nor has she consented to these suits. Advanced Video, therefore, has no standing to maintain its suit. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the cases."

其他:
法官Newman又說話了,她不同意法院如此狹隘地看到專利所有權,認為Hsiun在最初也不見得有專利共同所有權,如果有雇傭合約,也不需要有額外文件簽署證明當事人拋棄權利。

"Joint inventor Vivian Hsiun never had co-ownership of the ’788 Patent, contrary to the majority opinion. By her Employment Agreement, her invention was the property of her employer; she was not the owner, and she could not acquire ownership simply by refusing to sign a separate “assignment” document."

my two cents:
(重要)所有問題都是因為專利申請時有發明人並未簽署授讓書(assignment),使得後續補救都產生問題。

雇傭關係不代表員工在專利申請文件上的簽名與宣誓。不過,這在AIA有些補救(http://enpan.blogspot.tw/2013/04/aia.html)。

ownership看似單純,又似乎不簡單,提起訴訟前(或是權利買賣前,甚至提早到專利申請),要好好檢視一下ownership以及employment agreement,特別是專利權是"多次"轉讓而來的。

判決書:
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/16-2309.Opinion.1-9-2018.1.PDF(備份:https://app.box.com/s/9u9xdtsuvpvidxznsnjgpk4rb5v6yr6d

資料參考:
Lack of Signature on Assignment Declaration Nixes Standing for Patent Co-Owners

http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/24/lack-signature-assignment-declaration-nixes-standing/id=92386/

Ron

2018年1月25日 星期四

重複專利與121避風港的討論 - In re Janssen and NYU (Fed. Cir. 2018)

本篇案例In re Janssen and NYU (Johnson & Johnson) (Fed. Cir. 2018)討論

案件資訊:
上訴人:IN RE: JANSSEN BIOTECH, INC., NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
系爭專利:US6,284,471(PTAB no. 90/012,851

本案緣起USPTO、PTAB都在ex parte re-examination程序中作出因為重複專利(doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting)使得系爭專利無效(Claims 1-7)的決定。

系爭專利US6,284,471提出一種抗TNFA抗體(Anti-TNFalpha)以及相關測試(ANTI-TNFα ANTIBODIES AND ASSAYS EMPLOYING ANTI-TNFα ANTIBODIES),這是關於組織中腫瘤壞死因子"tumor necrosis factor"的抗體。

1. A chimeric antibody comprising at least part of a human immunoglobulin constant region and at least part of a non-human immunoglobulin variable region, said antibody capable of binding an epitope specific for human tumor necrosis factor TNFα, wherein the non-human immunoglobulin variable region comprises an amino acid sequence selected from the group consisting of SEQ ID NO: 3 and SEQ ID NO: 5.

PTAB no. 90/012,851:
本次系爭專利的"母案"與PTAB結論:



法院先說明"doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting":這個不予專利理由是要禁止核准與"第一件"專利沒有專利性區隔(patentably distinct)的"第二件"專利,避免不當延長專利權。

The doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting is intended to prevent the extension of the term of a patent by prohibiting the issuance of the claims of a second patent that are not patentably distinct from the claims of the first patent.

一些歷史:
本案爭議在專利權人Janssen主張系爭專利在35 U.S.C. § 121 的保護範圍內(避風港safe-harbor)。實務上,即便是121規範下的延續專利,仍會面對落入重複專利的問題(MPEP 804),而本次系爭專利是一路CIP下來的案子,這樣的案子是否仍在避風港內?甚至比CA/DIV案更有風險。


系爭專利面對自己的母案(No. 08/013,413)的阻礙,系爭專利屬於一個龐大專利家族的一員,常見於生技公司的專利佈局,其中不免會自己踩到自己,法院就將這些系爭關係畫個簡圖:


法院也同時理出相關專利的審查過程,包括在許多相近技術之間曾經處理的限制選擇、重複專利核駁、修正...等,細節過多不在此討論,有興趣者可看判決書。

2013年,系爭專利被提起再審程序(reexamination),USPTO即作出重複專利核駁,專利權人為了要直接取得更早母案'413的優先權而刪除了不被'413涵蓋的揭露內容與專利範圍,另一目的也想將系爭專利從CIP變成DIV案。

但是USPTO並不認同,即便Janssen作出了一些舉措,仍認為系爭專利有重複專利的問題。到了PTAB,委員會意見是,當過去專利權人主動/深思熟慮地提出CIP案(使用了母案內容以及母案以外的內容),此時,並不允許(或說認同)專利權人在再審程序中通過修正排除過去處心積慮佈局得到的專利,來獲得「避風港」的好處。

"The Board “found no reason to permit Janssen now, by amendment, to acquire the benefit of the safe harbor when Janssen voluntarily and deliberately filed a continuation-in-part application with claims directed to subject matter absent from the ’413 application and outside the scope of its restriction."

PTAB似乎是不認同專利權人在面對重複專利問題時的"心態"。
"The Board then applied the one-way test for double patenting because it found that there were at least four instances where Janssen’s actions “constituted deliberate and unnecessary actions that lengthened the prosecution time of the ’093 application.”"

專利權人上訴CAFC:
進入CAFC的主要議題是,是否系爭專利'471可以在專利法121條的避風港內而排除基於自己母案'272與'195的核駁意見?

反過來講,若專利處於「避風港」內(延續案形成的家族內),則可以排除重複專利的核駁意見(應該是指obviousness-type double patenting)。

法院的態度是:根據案例Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008)的啟示,DIV申請案與專利才在121法條規範的避風港內

"Our precedent is clear: aside from the original application and the original patent, the protection afforded by § 121 is limited to divisional applications and patents issued on divisional applications."

此案例還有個特別的議題是:如本次系爭專利專利權人的行為,當多年後,CIP專利在再審程序中面對重複專利駁回時,可否通過修正將CIP改成DIV案而重新落於121條避風港內?

答案:Searle案已給答案:不行。此案表示,專利權人不能簡單在"reissue程序"中把CIP案改成DIV案而重回避風港。

"In Searle we answered this question in the reissue context, holding that the patent owner could not take advantage of the safe-harbor provision simply by designating the CIP as a divisional application in a reissue application years after the fact. 790 F.3d at 1354–55."


這似乎是「動機與心態」的考驗,當專利已經獲准多年,也可能享受了一段時間的好處,專利權人不能通過(很明顯的動機)修正又"回溯"到當初的樣貌,甚至是要刻意排除當初專利申請的企圖,這個動機並不容於法。

"We are persuaded by the reasoning in Searle that a patent owner cannot retroactively bring its challenged patent within the scope of the safe-harbor provision by amendment in a reexamination proceeding.4 In Searle, the court assumed the reissue patent was properly grant-ed and still concluded the safe harbor did not apply."

因此,即便專利權人"多年後"通過修正讓專利從CIP轉變到DIV的狀態,這可能OK,卻不能"重回"避風港

本案結論:程序上,不能將核准時為CIP案日後轉變成DIV案(其目的是重回避風港,更是司馬昭之心),系爭專利不適用避風港,使得專利落於顯而易見性重複專利中,專利無效。

"The ’471 patent cannot retroactively become, for the purposes of § 121, a “patent issued on” a divisional application after it already issued on a CIP application; not even if that CIP application is effectively redesignated as a divisional application during reexamination."

"Thus, here too, even assuming Janssen’s amendments made during reexamination were to become effective by way of a reexamination certificate, we conclude that the ’471 patent is not entitled to safe-harbor protection."

"Because the safe-harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. § 121 does not apply to the ’471 patent to protect it from invali-dation based on the ’272 and ’195 reference patents, and because Janssen is not entitled to the two-way test for obviousness-type double patenting, we affirm the Board’s rejection of claims 1–7 of the ’471 patent as unpatentable under the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting."

my two cents:
本案例釐清「基於121法條的safe harbor」:
嚴格來說,僅DIV處於121避風港內;CIP案並不在避風港內。

本部落格曾有不少有關double patenting的報導,但並未涵蓋所有MPEP 804的情況,應該還有機會繼續補充,例如:
http://enpan.blogspot.tw/2011/02/double-patenting-i.html
http://enpan.blogspot.tw/2011/02/double-patenting-ii.html
http://enpan.blogspot.tw/2013/03/double-patenting-iii.html
http://enpan.blogspot.tw/2015/11/double-patenting-iv.html

涉及法條:35 U.S.C. § 121 Divisional Applications
If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application, the Director may require the application to be restricted to one of the inventions. If the other invention is made the subject of a divisional application which complies with the requirements of section 120 it shall be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the original application. A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a result of such a requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or against the original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other application. The validity of a patent shall not be questioned for failure of the Director to require the application to be restricted to one invention.

判決書:http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-1257.Opinion.1-19-2018.1.PDF(備份:https://app.box.com/s/gtlxnb68vnze4jo0d03329sje7f965p0

參考資料:
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/01/patent-blockbuster-remicade.html
https://www.bitlaw.com/source/mpep/804.html

Ron

2018年1月23日 星期二

專利用詞「Correspond to」討論 - Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2013)

本篇討論常見用以「對應」元件的專利用詞「Correspond to」,案例為Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2013)

本部落格曾報導此2013年Broadcom v. Emulex案,當時討論的重點是KSR判例之適用原則,當先前技術(多件)已經揭露了專利範圍中的元件,但卻沒有指出專利所解決問題,且沒有證據顯示為何(why)相關領域技術人員(PHOSITA)可以組合這些先前技術,專利所揭示發明應具有非顯而易見性(103)。這個判斷原則可以排除「後見之明」。

參考案例:Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
"finding invention nonobvious when none of the “reference[s] relate to the [problem] described in the patents”and no evidence was proffered indicating why a person having ordinary skill in the art would combine the references."


先前報導:相關技術人員知道技術,但可能不曉得待解決的問題(涉及KSR判例的適用)(http://enpan.blogspot.tw/2013/11/ksr.html

---------------------(以上為過去報導)------------------------------------

除以上重要議題外,本篇討論Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2013)案例中涉及專利用詞「Correspond to」的"較小議題"討論。

案件資訊:
原告/被上訴人:BROADCOM CORPORATION
被告/上訴人:EMULEX CORPORATION
系爭專利:US7,058,150
判決日:October 7, 2013

本案在地方法院判決被告Emulex侵權成立,且對侵權物核發永久禁制令。案件經被告上訴CAFC。

系爭專利US7,058,150關於一種高速收發器,系爭專利請求項Claim 8界定一個可以接收多序列數據的通訊裝置,裝置包括主時序產生器、多接收通道,以及每個接收通道上的插值(interpolator)控制模組(ICM),可以在通道上產生相位插值,以旋轉對應採樣訊號(類比轉數位)與序列數據之間頻率偏移的傳輸率的插值相位,降低數據間頻率偏移,通訊系統通過這些動作分辨出適當的傳輸率,調整採樣訊號的相位(持續旋轉)以符合傳輸頻率,利用時序與資料恢復的機制產生高速處理數據的效果。

8. A communication device configured to receive multiple serial data signals, comprising:
a master timing generator adapted to generate a master timing signal;
multiple receive-lanes each configured to receive an associated one of the multiple serial data signals, each receive-lane including
a phase interpolator adapted to produce a sampling signal having an interpolated phase, and
a data path adapted to sample and quantize the associated serial data signal in accordance with the sampling signal; and
an interpolator control module coupled to each receive-lane, the interpolator control module being adapted to cause the phase interpolator in each receive-lane to rotate the interpolated phase of the sampling signal in the receive-lane at a rate corresponding to a frequency offset between the sampling signal and the serial data signal associated with the receive-lane so as to reduce the frequency offset between the sampling signal and the serial data signal.
簡單來說,這就是描述Broadcom的高速數據傳輸IC,其中有個特徵是「ICM」以一"對應(corresponding to)"採樣訊號與實際訊號的頻率差異的速率旋轉採樣訊號的相位。

本案例主要關於非顯而易見性的爭辯,面對的先前技術為EP0909035("Pickering"),Pickering提出產生震盪訊號的裝置,也就是時脈產生器,以及同步輸出入訊號的裝置,其中在接收器"解調"時將恢復"對應"時脈。

證據顯示,Pickering揭露了系爭專利請求項8的所有特徵,除了傳輸數據的"data path"以外,也就是說,Pickering教示了恢復時脈的技術,卻不是針對"data",系爭專利Claim 8是要同時恢復時脈與數據。

被告在面對侵權告訴時,解釋專利範圍理出其中一個限制條件:"at a rate corresponding to":

"at a rate corresponding to a frequency offset between the sampling signal and the serial data signal associated with the receive-lane so as to reduce the frequency offset between the sampling signal and the serial data signal"

問題:是否被告Emulex產品的半速率(half-rate)被讀入系爭專利中"at a rate corresponding to a frequency offset ..."的限制中?

"The first infringement question is whether the “rate” in Emulex’s half-rate architecture “correspond[s] to a frequency offset” as required by claim 8."

法院的解釋是,說明書相對內部證據顯示"corresponding to"沒有必要限定在全速率"full rate",使得被告產品的"half-rate"被讀入。

(解釋一)這裡即涉及如何解釋"corresponding to",其實這是專利權人可定義的用詞,法院判斷系爭專利的相關記錄並非定義"corresponding to"為"equal to"。

"Moreover the record does not contain evidence that the patentee acted as his own lexicographer to define “corresponding to” as “equal to.”"

以下法院意見反覆地在多個討論專利用詞的判決中出現,也就是,最重要地,解釋特定專利用語,除了本身的意思外,說明書表達了發明人的原本想法,如此案,法官認為申請專利範圍解釋時排除實施例(可以quarter-rate)是少見的,因此將不會限制專利範圍在"full-rate"。


(解釋二)解釋特定專利用語,自然還是需要"說明書"輔助:"the specification shows that the "corresponding to" claim term does not limit the invention to full rate architecture."。

這個用語解釋是讓地院/CAFC法官認定侵權成立的關鍵之一。

(補充)
本案另有「禁制令」的爭辯,特別針對"irreparable harm",也是值得參考,可以直接參考判決書。

核發「永久」禁制令的測試:four-factor test(參考案例:eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006):http://enpan.blogspot.tw/2014/04/ebay-inc-v-mercexchange-llc.html):
  1. 原告遭遇不可回復的損害
  2. 法律規定的賠償並不足夠
  3. 原告與被告之間難以公平地得到補償
  4. 公眾利益不會被永久禁制令所影響
本案地院針對禁制令判決摘錄:

"First, the district court concluded that Broadcom suffered irreparable harm and was likely to continue to do so because of evidence that Emulex achieved design wins and market share gains at Broadcom’s expense."

"Second, the district court concluded that money damages would be inadequate to compensate Broadcom because of evidence that Emulex’s design wins caused unquantifiable secondary benefits to Emulex."

"Third, the district court found that the balance of hardships favors an injunction because
Emulex’s sales of infringing products amounted to only a small portion of its revenues."

"Fourth, the district court concluded that, to balance the public interest and equitable factors, the permanent injunction should include a sunset period to protect certain of Emulex’s customers from supply disruptions."

"Emulex were competitors and that Broadcom lost market share while Emulex gained it—thus Broadcom established irreparable harm."

my two cents:
本案例的資訊是來自工業技術研究院「從美國訴訟淺談專利撰寫答辯及請求項用語解釋研討會」的議程所揭示的內容。(編按,版主並未參與研討,僅是因此得知這個案例有此議題,經重新理解後PO文)

這件,並未探討是否有後續發展(網路上查不到),但看來是Broadcom大勝,關鍵因素自然是因為侵權成立,侵權成立的關鍵是專利夠格。

這裡,根據系爭專利的相關證據(這仍是關鍵),法官將"corresponding to"(對應)解釋更為寬廣,也是一般專利權人希望的那樣,避免用"equal to"等更為狹隘的用語,可以合理且適當地放大解釋。

判決書:http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/12-1309.Opinion.10-3-2013.1.PDF(備份:
https://app.box.com/s/ef9ph0rfg60xwnpy0wecck91p2mg99gn


Ron

2018年1月22日 星期一

秘密販售與合約是否阻礙新穎性,答案是"看情況" - Helsinn v. Teva (Fed. Cir. 2018)

CAFC於2017年對Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharmaceuticals案作出判決:

AIA並未改變pre-AIA設下的"on-sale bar",認為發明在critical date前的販售/販售之要約表示已經完成且預備提出專利申請,使得販售的行為成為專利的先前技術,以「on-sale bar」判定系爭專利相關申請專利範圍無效

先前相關報導:


以上意見是指「公開」的販售與合約會阻礙專利新穎性,但是「秘密」的呢?

2018年,Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharmaceuticals案經原告/被上訴人Helsinn提出en banc重審,CAFC駁回請求。


一般認為AIA之後應該已經改變了舊時(pre-AIA)之前的「on-sale bar」,但是,案件到此已經確立「on-sale bar」,也就是,專利申請前(有效申請日前超過一年優惠期)的合約已經形成新穎性的阻礙

沒有CAFC法官反對。

不過,是否「私下(未公開)」立約的行為會被視為「已經完成且預備提出專利申請」而造成102阻礙?目前答案是,看情況

摘錄O’MALLEY法官意見:
"We also must remember that “on sale” in § 102 covers not only consummated sales, but mere offers for sale as well."

"An offer to sell is sufficient under the policy animating the statute, which proscribes not a sale, distributor can trigger the on-sale bar even though the transaction is several steps removed from the consuming public actually acquiring the invention."

對此「Helsinn-EnBanc-Denial.」,O'Malley法官作出一些回應,避免「販售與合約阻礙新穎性」字面上的意思被誤會,其實背後是有條件的,而這個意見大概也是為將來進入最高法院鋪路。

O'Malley法官對照三個迷失,提出三個澄清(正面表示)(1) 並非每次「秘密合約」被公開時,就會觸發(trigger)"on-sale bar",而是需要一些因素的判斷;(2)不是所有供應端的合約都會引發專利無效,而是看情況;(3)CAFC意見與過去Medicines Co.判決一致。

"(1) we concluded that every time the fact of a sale is disclosed to the public, regardless of the nature of the disclosure, the on-sale bar in 35 U.S.C. § 102 will be triggered; (2) our decision implies that all supply-side agreements with third-party distributors will constitute invalidating transactions; and (3) our holding is inconsistent with our en banc decision in Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016)."

法院立場是,2017年的Helsinn v. Teva判決並不是說,所有公開的合約都會觸發on-sale bar而導致專利無效,但也非表示秘密販售與合約不會觸發on-sale bar,而是"看情況"。這些僅是形成判斷商業販售致使on-sale bar的眾多條件之一。

"Indeed, other factors may counsel in favor of finding that a publicly announced transaction is insufficient to trigger the on-sale bar, depending on the circumstances."

根據Helsinn v. Teva案內容,Helsinn與藥廠MGI合約載明專利藥的方程式細節,使得法院判定在專利critical date(有效申請日、或申請前優惠期日)前已經商業行銷,使得觸發on-sale bar,這也符合Medicines案判決。這表示critical date前「合約」內是否載明專利細節是個觸發on-sale bar的關鍵因素之一。

避免被誤會HelsinnMedicines案判決有對小公司(需要對外簽約生產專利產品)不利的意思,這裡說明一個交易不會是形成「商業販售」的要件,即便這個交易形成因應販售的「儲備」,不一定會觸發on-sale bar。法官重申法院不會是阻礙商業發展的元兇。

"We held in Medicines that, where a transaction does not bear the hallmarks of a commercial sale—even where the transaction results in stockpiling of product for future potential sales—the on-sale bar will not be triggered."

所述"on-sale bar"不僅包括販售,而是還包括販售要約(offer for sale),也就是供應商與經銷商/批發商之間的合約,將會觸發on-sale bar。這裡提出一個法律意見,法院祭出on-sale bar是要避免發明人利用商業手法超越專利的法定期限。

"As an initial matter, this policy goal is not the only one that animates the on-sale bar. Both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized that another concern underlying the on-sale bar—and in fact, the “overriding” concern—is the risk that an inventor will commercially exploit his invention beyond the statutory term."

如此顯得Helsinn在其訴訟中被認為專利申請前(critical date之前)的商業合約與販售「證據確鑿」,因此造成專利無效。

my two cents:
意思是,秘密販售與秘密合約可能阻礙新穎性,這是專利申請的風險之一,並非絕對。

顯然,美國法院(至少到CAFC)認定的新穎性,與我們國內實務運作不同,我國還有「擬制新穎性同人不適用」的優惠,甚至是「定義」不同,不過,如果還能上訴最高法院,應該還是要統一見解,即使過去(pre-AIA)已有見解。

資料參考:
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/01/denied-secret-patentability.html

Ron

2018年1月18日 星期四

米開朗基羅的大衛像需要官方授權才能商業使用

案件資訊:
學院美術館(Galleria dell'Accademiahttp://www.accademia.org/it/


佛羅倫斯地方法院(Tribunale di Firenze / Florence district court)於2017年10月25日作出意見,認為旅遊公司「Visit Today(http://visittodayitaly.com)」並沒有通過授權合法商業使用(行銷、商業廣告)米開朗基羅的大衛像(Michelangelo's David)的圖像。

從ipkitten得到一段法院意見的翻譯:

根據義大利文化財產法,管理文化物品的管理者有權授權提出申請與繳交授權費的對象「重製」文化物品,但非營利用途除外。

這回,「大衛像」,毫無疑問的是定義的文化物品,「學院美術館」為管理者,被告Visit Today需要通過學院美術館授權才能重製大衛像。

"Article 108 of the Cultural Heritage Code provides that the authority which administers a cultural good has the right to allow its reproduction, subject to an application and the payment of a royalty set by the authority itself, with the sole exception of reproductions of work for non-profit purposes.
There is no doubt that the sculpture at issue [David] is a cultural good, nor is there any doubt that the authority that administers it is the Galleria dell' Accademia, which is subject to the Ministry [of Culture]; it follows that its use for for-profit purposes done through the reproduction of its image falls within the cases for which the authorization of the administrative authority is needed."

本案判決Visit Today從網站上撤下大衛像等有關文化古蹟的圖片,否則一天罰2000歐元( €2,000)。

法院意見:https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Yn-aXmQitAtn2x9twx8_NeNyvrtcd4in/view?usp=sharing

my two cents:
既然「大衛像」僅在"非營利目的下"才是「全人類遺產」,在商業使用下需要被授權,而且適用全歐洲(全世界?),這樣,很多紀念品大概都會被影響,甚至也會減損行銷義大利的效果。如果,某種程度地釋放善意,也算是文化推廣。

是否這個判決會有後續,可能有機會要持續追蹤,不然,這個決定會讓很多歐洲古蹟、文物,或是只要擁有老東西的人都可以適用(可能很多義大利人多少都繼承到一些文化古物),到處都是地雷,必須要避免濫用。

「版權」,或說著作權,總是有點麻煩(或說不懂),常常要想何謂「合理使用(fair use)」:
著作權法在第44條到第63條規定許多合理使用的情形,像是:為了立法、行政、司法目的參考利用、學校教學目的的重製、個人或家庭非營利的重製、合理引用、新聞報導的利用、圖書館等文教機構的重製、非營利活動中的公開利用、合法電腦程式的修改或重製、耗盡原則等,將社會上經常會利用到他人著作,但是對於 著作權人影響不大的情形,直接列為合理使用的規定,減輕利用人在授權取得方面的負擔。

這個「合理使用」的設計是「減輕在授權取得方面的負擔」,但是如果著作權人反對,理應該下架的還是應該要下架。

「重製權」:
沒有經過著作財產權人的同意,對他人的著作加以重製,只要不符合合理使用的規定,就會侵害「重製權」。「重製」可說是最重要的著作利用方式,一般人最常碰到的也是重製的問題,因此,著作權法在第44條到第63條有關個別合理使用的條文,把許多對於他人著作在合理範圍內的「重製」,都列為合理使用的規定,像是:老師為了學校教學的目的,可以重製他人著作的一小部分發給同學上課練習使用、為了個人非營利的目的,可以重製他人著作自行利用、台北101大樓雖然是建築著作,遊客都可以自由地將台北101大樓入鏡,雖然是用攝影方式重製台北101大樓,但依法是屬於合理使用,無須取得授權。



相似案件
http://enpan.blogspot.tw/2014/11/blog-post_11.html
(2007 A.D.)

訴訟資訊:
http://ipkitten.blogspot.tw/2017/11/florence-courts-decision-on-use-of.html
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/24/florence-court-puts-foot-down-over-michelangelos-david
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/24/davids-assets-protected-italy-bans-images-ofmichelangelos-famous/

新聞來源:
https://global.udn.com/global_vision/story/8664/2885138

Ron