轉移法院的主要法條依據是:28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
CAFC是否受理這類上訴理由,還是有條件的,包括(1)上訴人應證明明確而不可爭辯的權利;(2)除了請願以外沒有其他適當的救濟方法;(3)在當下情況下是適當的。
潘榮恩專利部落格、專利實務、專利筆記與Linux
enpan's Patent & Linux practice
(http://enpan.blogspot.tw/, http://enpan.blogspot.com/)
(接受委託安排課程)
ronpan@gmail.com,
enpan@msn.com
The patent or application file contains at least one drawing executed in color. Copies of this patent or patent application publication with color drawing(s) will be provided by the Office upon request and payment of the necessary fee.
要證明專利不具非顯而易知性(進步性),應提出證據,並證明發明在證據揭示內容下具有成功的合理期待(reasonable expectation of success)。
案件資訊:
上訴人/專利權人:UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE
被上訴人:CLEAR-VU LIGHTING LLC
系爭專利:US9,839,706(IPR2019-00431)
判決日:November 4, 2021
系爭專利關於暴露在400-500nm可見光或特定光線下滅掉革蘭氏陽性菌(gram-positive bacteria,包括MRSA, CONS, 鏈球菌、腸球菌和梭菌物種)活性的方法。
系爭專利背景關於以抗生素滅菌卻產生抗藥性,因為人類對抗生素有抗藥性,使得細菌感染率上升,系爭專利發明則是提出了控制感染的方法。先前技術所使用的光滅菌方式(photoinactivation)是通過一種可以450–850 nm波長範圍的光致活的光敏劑(photosensitizer),但是習知技術的缺點就是需要先將"光敏劑"用在要滅活的細菌上。
系爭專利'706的Claim 1如下,描述一個空氣滅菌的方法,通過滅活(inactivate)空氣中的致病性革蘭氏陽性菌達成接觸表面與材料消毒的目的,方法是用光照方式滅菌,但不使用光敏劑(photosensitizer),這裡還界定出所謂「致病性革蘭氏陽性菌」是選自MRSA, CONS, Streptococcus, Enterococcus以及Clostridium,用來滅菌的可見光波長範圍是400-420nm。
1. A method for disinfecting air, contact surfaces or materials by inactivating one or more pathogenic Gram-positive bacteria in the air, on the contact surfaces or on the materials, said method comprising exposing the one or more pathogenic Gram-positive bacteria to visible light without using a photosensitizer, wherein the one or more pathogenic Gram-positive bacteria are selected from the group consisting of Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), Coagulase-Negative Staphylococcus (CONS), Streptococcus, Enterococcus, and Clostridium species, and wherein a portion of the visible light that inactivates the one or more pathogenic Gram-positive bacteria consists of wavelengths in the range 400-420 nm, and wherein the method is performed outside of the human body and the contact surfaces or the materials are non-living.
根據系爭專利發明人的說法,實驗證明將細菌暴露在藍光或具有藍光成分的光線下可以滅除其活性,發現400-450nm的可見光是主要的誘發因子,其中比較好的範圍是400-420nm,最佳為405nm。
在IPR程序中,判定系爭專利'706的claims 1, 3為顯而易見(證據Ashkenazi, Nitzan),claims 2, 4為顯而易見(證據Jones)。上訴議題僅涉及證據Ashkenazi, Nitzan的討論,也就是PTAB認為即便先前技術Ashkenazi與Nitzan都非"不使用光敏劑(photosensitizer)"滅菌的技術,但相關領域一般技術人員基於Ashkenazi與Nitzan對系爭案發明中不使用光敏劑(photosensitizer)這個特徵有合理的期待(reasonable expectation),判定相關專利範圍為顯而易見。
PTAB的意見:
專利權人對PTAB終判提起上訴,CAFC階段:
針對35U.S.C.103非顯而易見性的判斷,主要考量是:(1)先前技術是否揭露發明特徵(請求項技術特徵)、(2)是否相關領域一般技術人員有結合或修改先前技術的動機、(3)相關領域一般技術人員是否有動機去結合或通過修改先前技術的教示而對達成發明有成功的合理期待(reasonable expectation of success)。
對本案來說,專利權人主張先前技術Ashkenazi與Nitzan並沒有教示在沒有使用光敏劑的情況下進行滅菌的技術。
先前技術是否有教示系爭專利特徵,以下是法院的判斷邏輯:
(1)先前技術Ashkenazi並未揭露或建議不使用光敏劑進行滅菌。
(2)雖然先前技術Nitzan提到MRSA與其他菌種在沒有ALA或其他光敏劑而暴露在藍光下的描述,但並沒有證據顯示Nitzan成功達成滅菌(inactivation,消滅細菌活性)的效果。
法官認為,根據先前技術內容,沒有證據顯示相關領域一般技術人員會選擇不使用光敏劑而去執行滅菌,因此否決PTAB的判決。
對於成功的合理期待的判斷邏輯:
(1)先前技術Ashkenazi與Nitzan並未提供任何證據或數據或資訊表示可以在不使用光敏劑而能成功地滅菌。
(2)訴訟雙方都同意所述MRSA自然會產生一些"endogenous porphyrins",用光啟動這種分子會滅除特定物質的活性,也就是證明MRSA暴露在特定波長藍光下會被滅活,這樣仍沒有教示不使用光敏劑而能成功地滅菌的特徵。
(3)甚至證據顯示,在沒有光敏劑的情況下,是無法滅除MRSA的。
這裡涉及一些實驗數據,包括專家證詞,經此嚴格的審理後,判定沒有可靠的指標可以期待在不使用光敏劑的條件下是可能滅除MRSA細菌的活性。
"In this case, where the prior art evidences only failures to achieve that at which the inventors succeeded, no reasonable fact finder could find an expectation of success based on the teachings of that same prior art."
CAFC判決:法院否決PTAB決定。
my two cents:
對本案來說,應該是個難判的例子,因為系爭專利的特徵是用負面表示來表達出來的:exposing the one or more pathogenic Gram-positive bacteria to visible light without using a photosensitizer,但是可能在相關領域中,不使用特定物質是個"困難的決定",或是"無法預期的技術",甚至討論到相關領域一般技術人員並不會選擇不用某個物質而達成特定效果(滅菌),當然,主要還是要"整體"來看專利範圍,而非單獨特徵來看,就會淪於技術比對而已。本案專利權獲判核准的主要理由是除了先前技術沒有揭露相關技術外,還有先前技術並非針對滅菌的目的(inactivation),就是提都沒提到,沒有教示的可能:
判決文:https://cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders/20-2243.OPINION.11-4-2021_1859852.pdf(備份:https://app.box.com/s/fdica3e1m6mnew5gvra0mij7xp1e0yvh)
Ron

If an applicant initially replies within 2 months from the date of mailing of any final rejection setting a 3-month shortened statutory period for reply and the Office does not mail an advisory action until after the end of the 3-month shortened statutory period, the period for reply for purposes of determining the amount of any extension fee will be the date on which the Office mails the advisory action advising applicant of the status of the application, but in no event can the period extend beyond 6 months from the date of the final rejection. This procedure applies only to a first reply to a final rejection. The following language must be included by the examiner in each final rejection.
A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY TO THIS FINAL ACTION IS SET TO EXPIRE THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THIS ACTION. IN THE EVENT A FIRST REPLY IS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE MAILING DATE OF THIS FINAL ACTION AND THE ADVISORY ACTION IS NOT MAILED UNTIL AFTER THE END OF THE THREE-MONTH SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD, THEN THE SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD WILL EXPIRE ON THE DATE THE ADVISORY ACTION IS MAILED, AND ANY EXTENSION FEE PURSUANT TO 37 CFR 1.136(a) WILL BE CALCULATED FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THE ADVISORY ACTION. IN NO EVENT WILL THE STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY EXPIRE LATER THAN SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THIS FINAL ACTION.
For example, if applicant initially replies within 2 months from the date of mailing of a final rejection and the examiner mails an advisory action before the end of 3 months from the date of mailing of the final rejection, the shortened statutory period will expire at the end of 3 months from the date of mailing of the final rejection. In such a case, if a petition for extension of time is granted, the due date for a reply is computed from the date stamped or printed on the Office action with the final rejection. See MPEP § 710.01(a). If the examiner, however, does not mail an advisory action until after the end of 3 months, the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the examiner mails the advisory action and any extension of time fee may be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event will the statutory period for reply expire later than 6 months from the mailing date of the final Office action.
See also MPEP § 706.07(f).
前言:
怎麼判斷商標侵權?商標最大的存在意義就是具有「識別性」,而侵權判斷原則之一,也算是主要判斷原則是「混淆的可能性(Likelihood of Confusion)」,判斷時,調查"被告侵權商標"是否對一般消費者而言會與"原告商標"產生混淆,混淆會稀釋原本商標的識別性與價值,若從本部落格找,有些細節可參考以下案例。
- 商標混淆的證據 - Swagway v. Segway and ITC (Fed. Cir. 2019)(https://enpan.blogspot.com/2019/05/swagway-v-segway-and-itc-fed-cir-2019.html)
其中提到ITC判斷造成混淆的可能性的幾個條件:有證據、發音接近、不良使用意圖、與競爭商品有關聯、消費者要在乎,以及原告商標強度要高。
(1) evidence of actual consumer confusion;(真實消費者混淆的證據)
(2) the degree of similarity in appearance and pronunciation between the marks; (商標發音的相似度)
(3) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;(行為人使用疑似侵權商標的意圖)
(4) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the products bearing the mark or designation;(使用疑似侵權商標的產品的使用與行銷的關聯性)
(5) the degree of care exercised by consumers of the marked or designated products;(消費者對於記載相關商標的商品的在乎程度)
(6) the strength of the mark.(商標的強度)
- 消費者下決定背後的心理議題 - Ceramiche Caesar SpA v Caesarstone Sdot-Yam Ltd (SGCA 2017)(https://enpan.blogspot.com/2017/08/ceramiche-caesar-spa-v-caesarstone-sdot.html)
- Skechers的Onix侵害了Adidas的Stan Smith的Trade Dress - Adidas America, Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc. (9th Cir. 2018)(https://enpan.blogspot.com/2021/08/skechersonixadidasstan-smithtrade-dress.html)
- 商標混淆的可能性:DuPont factors - In re Guild Mortgage Company (Fed. Cir. 2019)(https://enpan.blogspot.com/2019/01/dupont-factors-in-re-guild-mortgage.html)
現行多數法官採用的混淆的可能性判斷Dupont factors:(以下是我的中文翻譯,有興趣者應參考原文,如以上連結)
(1) 標誌在外觀、聲音、意義與商業印象的相似度
(2) 在商標註冊申請書中描述的商品或服務的本質與前案的相似度
(3) 建立或是可能繼續的貿易渠道的相似度
(4) 買家對於銷售商品衝動、謹慎或精明的條件
(5) 先前商標的知名度(販售、廣告、使用時間)
(6) 相似商標使用在相似的商品的數量與性質
(7) 實際混淆的程度
(8) 在沒有實際混淆的證據下同時使用的時間與條件
(9) 使用與沒有使用商標的商品,如家族標誌
(10) 商標申請人與先前商標權人之間的市場分界線
(11) 申請人有權排除他人使用商標的程度
(12) 潛在混淆的程度,是微量還是有實質的混淆
(13) 其他證明使用商標的效果的事實
Ron