MPEP 2114：https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2114.html
經客戶提起MPEP 2114中規定在「裝置專利範圍」中非結構特徵不會拿來與前案區隔，因此在裝置專利範圍中描述裝置的功能與要做的事是不會拿來評估專利性的。這是對的，然而，這仍是要看是否為先前裝置固有的功能。
在此就做些筆記。
MPEP2114規範「裝置與物品專利範圍」中的功能性用語。
第I節描述"裝置申請專利範圍"中固有特徵與功能性限制，其中說明裝置專利範圍可以結構或功能來描述，引用案例「In re Schreiber」提到，如果審查委員認為功能性限制為＂先前技術＂固有特徵（inherent characteristic of the prior art）時，即建立新穎性或顯而易知性的表面證據（prima case of anticipation or obviousness），而審查委員需要解釋「先前技術的結構固有地擁有所要求保護的裝置的功能性限制」。這時，責任就落在申請人，申請人要證明先前技術結構並沒有這些功能性特徵。
重點一：因此裝置專利範圍中涉及功能性的特徵是否有專利性的意義，是要比對先前技術來決定。
可參考：裝置特徵在結構，並非功能 - In Re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)案例討論（https://enpan.blogspot.com/2015/03/in-re-schreiber-128-f3d-1473-fed-cir.html）。
在第II節規範「裝置專利範圍中沒有與先前技術區隔的操作方法」。
重點二：裝置專利範圍應界定裝置是什麼，而不是裝置做什麼。
引用CAFC案例"Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc. (Fed. Cir. 1990)"，如果"習知裝置"教示（teach）請求項裝置的所有結構特徵，請求項中主張的「裝置」使用方式（manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed）也無法與習知裝置區隔。
根據案例Ex parte Masham (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987)，其中claim 1前言部分描述裝置"用於混合流動顯影材料"，而其主體描述混合物（means for mixing），此混合物靜置浸於顯影材料中。此發明被駁回理由是先前技術已經揭露結構特徵，而混合物僅部分浸於顯影材料，但其預期使用就是混合流動顯影劑。訴願委員認為是否部分或全部浸於顯影劑中對結構特徵比對而言並不影響。
在第III節中，說明習知裝置可執行專利裝置所有的功能但不見得能預期（anticipate）到此裝置。
重點三：即便習知裝置執行了所有請求項描述的功能，如果仍有結構差異，習知裝置並未能預期此請求項發明。（此重點為平衡上述重點，說明裝置發明還是以結構特徵為主。）
其中特別說明的是，功能手段用語的結構等同說明書對應的結構，引用CAFC案例In re Donaldson (Fed. Cir. 1994)。參考In re Robertson (Fed. Cir. 1999)，此案例中，發明為具有三個固定元件的尿布，習知技術則包括有兩個固定元件，但執行了相同的功能。法院解釋專利範圍，認為其要求三個分開的固定元件，判定先前技術並未"固有地或是明白地"揭露分離的三個固定元件。
可參考：1994年解釋專利範圍中功能手段用語的一般原則 - In re Donaldson (Fed. Cir. 1994, en banc)（https://enpan.blogspot.com/2017/07/1994-in-re-donaldson-fed-cir-1994-en.html）。
在第IV節中，判斷是否電腦實現的功能性專利特徵相對先前技術為符合102, 103發明。
功能性專利範圍因為並不限定在特定結構而可能涵蓋所有可以執行所述功能的裝置，因此，如果先前技術揭露了可以固有地執行請求項功能的裝置，裝置可能就不符102, 103專利要件。
關於電腦實現的發明，參考CAFC案例Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n (Fed. Cir. 1991)，法院判定"programmable"的請求項用語涵蓋範圍為要執行請求項記載之功能的產品上。其中重要的是，若其中新開發的功能或特性為先前技術固有的，並不能與先前技術區隔。
反之，電腦實現的功能請求項可以通過限制能夠執行該功能的結構來限定裝置的功能。參考前例Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. Nokia Corp. (Fed Cir. 2014)，申請專利範圍為可執行處理暫存器為底與疊層為底的指令的CPU，原告主張專利範圍涵蓋能執行請求項描述的功能的硬體，但法院判定系爭專利範圍是軟硬體的組合以能執行其中功能，但被告硬體就不被專利範圍所涵蓋，理由是被告硬體無法致動軟體功能。
重點四：可參考「軟硬體結合產生的功能專利主張權利失利（Nazomi Comms. v. Nokia Corp.）（https://enpan.blogspot.com/2014/03/cafcnazomi-comms-v-nokia-corp.html）」，本篇的結論是：因為功能描述限縮了專利範圍所稱的硬體特徵，CAFC判斷侵權不成立。
重點五：電腦實現的功能專利範圍仍可以很廣的，因為所謂電腦可以各種具有不同複雜度與算力的裝置（"Computer-implemented functional claim limitations may also be broad because the term “computer” is commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to describe a variety of devices with varying degrees of complexity and capabilities."，參考案例In re Paulsen (Fed. Cir. 1994)）。
因此，申請專利範圍包括了"computer"，並不會限定在有特定特徵的裝置，除非改寫成其他用語而清楚定義為其他特別的意思。
重點六：基於KSR判例（KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (2007)），在電腦上實現已知功能，如果其中為在一般目的電腦上自動完成已知功能，而沒有超過習知技術可預期的運用，為顯而易知。
可參考KSR v. Teleflex案簡單描述（https://enpan.blogspot.com/2009/02/ksr-v-teleflex.html），此案例結論是：結合多種習知技術的「組合發明」落於「沒有產生超出預期的結果」、「一般技術人員能實踐可預期的變化」或是「欲解決已知問題」，不能獲得專利。
相似地，電腦實現的技術常常面對的情況是，所執行的步驟都是已知的步驟，而僅是轉移到電腦執行，或合併網路瀏覽器技術執行通訊與顯示資訊，因為這些是常見技術，將判定為顯而易知，不容易或准專利。
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2114 Apparatus and Article Claims — Functional Language
For a discussion of case law which provides guidance in interpreting the functional portion of means-plus-function limitations see MPEP § 2181 - § 2186.
I. INHERENCY AND FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS IN APPARATUS CLAIMS
Features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also MPEP § 2173.05(g). If an examiner concludes that a functional limitation is an inherent characteristic of the prior art, then to establish a prima case of anticipation or obviousness, the examiner should explain that the prior art structure inherently possesses the functionally defined limitations of the claimed apparatus. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d at 1478, 44 USPQ2d at 1432. See also Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 639-40,100 USPQ2d 1433, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The burden then shifts to applicant to establish that the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d at 1478, 44 USPQ2d at 1432; In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213, 169 USPQ 226, 228 (CCPA 1971) (“where the Patent Office has reason to believe that a functional limitation asserted to be critical for establishing novelty in the claimed subject matter may, in fact, be an inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority to require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on”).
II. MANNER OF OPERATING THE DEVICE DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE APPARATUS CLAIM FROM THE PRIOR ART
“[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co.v.Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original). A claim containing a “recitation with respect to the manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not differentiate the claimed apparatus from a prior art apparatus” if the prior art apparatus teaches all the structural limitations of the claim. Ex parte Masham, 2 USPQ2d 1647 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987) (The preamble of claim 1 recited that the apparatus was “for mixing flowing developer material” and the body of the claim recited “means for mixing ..., said mixing means being stationary and completely submerged in the developer material.” The claim was rejected over a reference which taught all the structural limitations of the claim for the intended use of mixing flowing developer. However, the mixer was only partially submerged in the developer material. The Board held that the amount of submersion is immaterial to the structure of the mixer and thus the claim was properly rejected.).
III. A PRIOR ART DEVICE CAN PERFORM ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF THE APPARATUS CLAIM AND STILL NOT ANTICIPATE THE CLAIM
Even if the prior art device performs all the functions recited in the claim, the prior art cannot anticipate the claim if there is any structural difference. It should be noted, however, that means-plus-function limitations are met by structures which are equivalent to the corresponding structures recited in the specification. In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49 USPQ2d 1949, 1951 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (The claims were drawn to a disposable diaper having three fastening elements. The reference disclosed two fastening elements that could perform the same function as the three fastening elements in the claims. The court construed the claims to require three separate elements and held that the reference did not disclose a separate third fastening element, either expressly or inherently.).
IV. DETERMINING WHETHER A COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED FUNCTIONAL CLAIM LIMITATION IS PATENTABLE OVER THE PRIOR ART UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102 AND 103
Functional claim language that is not limited to a specific structure covers all devices that are capable of performing the recited function. Therefore, if the prior art discloses a device that can inherently perform the claimed function, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102 and/or 35 U.S.C. 103 may be appropriate. See In re Translogic Technology, Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1258, 84 USPQ2d 1929, 1935-1936 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (The claims were drawn to multiplexer circuit. The patent at issue claimed “coupled to” and “coupled to receive” between various portions of the circuitry. In reference to the claim phrase “input terminals ‘coupled to receive’ first and second input variables,” the court held that “the claimed circuit does not require any specific input or connection … [a]s such, ‘coupled to’ and ‘coupled to receive’ are clearly different … [a]s shown in [the figures of the] patent, input terminals … only need to be ‘capable of receiving’ an input variable for the multiplexer circuit as claimed”. Therefore, the specification supported the claim construction “that ‘coupled to receive’ means ‘capable of receiving.’”); Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 832, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (The court held that “programmable” claim language required only that the accused product could be programmed to perform the claimed functionality.);In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254, 195 USPQ 430, 433 (CCPA 1977); In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 663-64, 169 USPQ 563, 566-67 (CCPA 1971); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971) (“[I]t is elementary that the mere recitation of a newly discovered function or property, inherently possessed by things in the prior art, does not cause a claim drawn to those things to distinguish over the prior art”). See MPEP § 2112 for more information.
Conversely, computer-implemented functional claim limitations may narrow the functionality of the device, by limiting the specific structure capable of performing the recited function. Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 739 F.3d 1339, 1345, 109 USPQ2d 1258, 1262 (Fed Cir. 2014) (The claims were drawn to a CPU that can perform processing of both register-based and stack-based instructions. Appellant alleged infringement of the claims based on claim construction requiring only hardware capable of performing the claimed functionalities. Contrasted with the finding of Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 821, 832, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the court found that “[s]ince hardware cannot meet these limitations in the absence of enabling software, the claims are properly construed as claiming an apparatus comprising a combination of hardware and software capable of practicing the claim limitations.”).
Computer-implemented functional claim limitations may also be broad because the term “computer” is commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to describe a variety of devices with varying degrees of complexity and capabilities. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479-80, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Therefore, a claim containing the term “computer” should not be construed as limited to a computer having a specific set of characteristics and capabilities, unless the term is modified by other claim terms or clearly defined in the specification to be different from its common meaning. Id. In Paulsen, the claims, directed to a portable computer, were rejected as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. 102 by a reference that disclosed a calculator, because the term “computer” was given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification to include a calculator, and a calculator was considered to be a particular type of computer by those of ordinary skill in the art. Id.
When determining whether a computer-implemented functional claim would have been obvious, examiners should note that broadly claiming an automated means to replace a manual function to accomplish the same result does not distinguish over the prior art. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161, 82 USPQ2d 1687, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Accommodating a prior art mechanical device that accomplishes [a desired] goal to modern electronics would have been reasonably obvious to one of ordinary skill in designing children’s learning devices. Applying modern electronics to older mechanical devices has been commonplace in recent years.”); In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95, 120 USPQ 193, 194 (CCPA 1958); see also MPEP § 2144.04. Furthermore, implementing a known function on a computer has been deemed obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art if the automation of the known function on a general purpose computer is nothing more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1396 (2007); see also MPEP § 2143, Exemplary Rationales D and F. Likewise, it has been found to be obvious to adapt an existing process to incorporate Internet and Web browser technologies for communicating and displaying information because these technologies had become commonplace for those functions. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1326-27, 87 USPQ2d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
For more information on the obviousness determination, see MPEP § 2141.
Ron
