潘榮恩專利部落格、專利實務、專利筆記與Linux
enpan's Patent & Linux practice
(http://enpan.blogspot.tw/, http://enpan.blogspot.com/)
(接受委託安排課程)
ronpan@gmail.com,
enpan@msn.com
2022年12月29日 星期四
著作權登記的安全港(safe harbor)- Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. (Supreme Court 2021)
2022年12月23日 星期五
獨立請求項之間的矛盾(化學成分) - 歐洲訴願案T 0528/06
2022年12月15日 星期四
專利審查基準第四篇新型專利「第一章形式審查」 - 筆記
對於習慣寫發明專利說明書的人來說,「新型專利審查」似乎規定甚嚴,很不自由,或說"鐵板一塊","審查意見甚至要求的比專利審查基準還多",想要"盡量"避免新型核駁,就此筆記。
- 形式審查:主要是「判斷新型專利申請案」是否「屬物品形狀、構造或組合者」,再是「說明書、申請專利範圍、摘要及圖式之揭露方式是否合於規定:揭露必要事項、明確性」,還要考量是否具有單一性。
- 申請專利之新型必須:(1)利用自然法則之技術思想;(2)範疇為物品;(3)具體表現於形狀、構造或組合。
- 物品之形狀、構造或組合者:請求項前言部分應記載一物品(有確定形狀且占據一定空間者),主體部分所載之技術特徵必須有一結構特徵(形狀、構造或組合,且只要有一結構特徵就OK)。
- 新型所指物品須具有確定之形狀。
- 構造:指物品內部或其整體之構成,實質表現上大多為各組成元件間的安排、配置及相互關係,且此構造之各組成元件並非以其本身原有的機能獨立運作者(物質之分子結構或組成物之組成並不屬於新型專利所稱物品之構造)。
- 組合:指為達到某一特定目的,將二個以上具有單獨使用機能之物品予以結合裝設,於使用時彼此在機能上互相關連而能產生使用功效者。
- (這段我最常來引用答辯屬於新型保護標的的創作)符合物品之形狀、構造或組合的規定的案例:
例1:請求項已描述物品之形狀、構造或組合之技術特徵,雖其說明書或申請專利範圍亦涉及以視覺美感的訴求者。
例2:以二段式撰寫之請求項,其特徵在於材料或方法者。(要整體來看)
例3:同時涉及物品之形狀、構造或組合之技術特徵及材料之技術特徵者。
例4:申請標的涉及軟體與硬體資源協同運作者。(適用軟體方法特徵為主的新型專利適格性答辯)
- 關於說明書、申請專利範圍、摘要與圖式的揭露方式,只要符合專利法及細則中關於說明書、申請專利範圍、摘要及圖式之撰寫格式規定即可,其他實體內容,例如:有無相關前案資料、是否具有新穎性及進步性,則不在形式審查之列。至於是否明確且充分揭露,亦非形式審查的範疇,但可作日後舉發事由。
- 說明書:記載規定與發明專利申請案一致。
- 申請專利範圍:撰寫規定與發明一致,只是專利標的應為「物品之形狀、構造或組合者」。
- 摘要:應簡要敘明新型所揭露之內容,並以所欲解決之問題、解決 問題之技術手段及主要用途為限
- 圖式:說明書中代表圖應指定最能代表該新型技術特徵之圖。申請專利之新型為物品之形狀、構造或組合,為達到明確且充分揭露之目的,新型應備具至少一個圖式,揭露其新型物品之形狀、構造或組合。
- 單一性,因為新型專利形式審查不進行前案檢索,因此單一性判斷僅形式上判斷。
- 形式審查下,說明書、申請專利範圍或圖式是否揭露必要事項,或其揭露是否明確,判斷順序:(1)各獨立項是否記載必要之構件及其連結關係;(2)說明書及圖式中是否記載前述構件及連結關係;(3)申請專利範圍所敘述之形狀、構造或組合和說明書及圖式中之記載是否無明顯矛盾之處。(所以新型形式審查的圖式超重要)
新型專利審查基準:https://topic.tipo.gov.tw/patents-tw/dl-279551-7a470d4471664b978eaa11ef8f560e08.html
my two cents:
關於「摘要」撰寫規定,曾經面對新型專利形式審查不符「專利法施行細則第45條準用第21條第4項規定」的審查意見,專利法施行細則第45條規定:「第十三條至第二十三條、第二十六條至第二十八條、第三十條、第三十四條至第三十八條規定,於新型專利準用之。」
根據說明書格式的規定,所謂「摘要」包括:「中英文新型名稱」、「中英文摘要」以及「指定代表圖」,如以下摘錄的規定,針對「中英文摘要」並未規定應揭露獨立項所述結構特徵。
專利法施行細則第21條:
(第1項)摘要,應簡要敘明發明所揭露之內容,並以所欲解決之問題、解決問題之技術手段及主要用途為限;其字數,以不超過二百五十字為原則;有化學式者,應揭示最能顯示發明特徵之化學式。
(第2項)摘要,不得記載商業性宣傳用語。
(第3項)摘要不符合前二項規定者,專利專責機關得通知申請人限期修正,或依職權修正後通知申請人。
(第3項)申請人應指定最能代表該發明技術特徵之圖為代表圖,並列出其主要符號,簡要加以說明。
(第4項)未依前項規定指定或指定之代表圖不適當者,專利專責機關得通知申請人限期補正,或依職權指定或刪除後通知申請人。
Ron
2022年12月8日 星期四
涉及非技術性特徵的進步性答辯案例 - 歐洲訴願案T643/00
2022年12月7日 星期三
判斷是否移轉審理法院或管轄地的因素 - Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. (CAFC 2022)
過去報導引用Cray案的案例:
2022年11月30日 星期三
審查歷程棄權原則並非天條,仍關乎審理層級與當下專利範圍的解釋 - CUPP COMPUTING AS v. TREND MICRO INC. (Fed. Cir. 2022)
專利權人CUPP的回應是,有部分專利範圍的描述是「security system processor」會傳送訊號到行動裝置,並提到安全系統通過「資料通訊埠」與行動裝置通訊,並設有通訊介面,因此主張行動裝置是在與外部裝置通訊。
CAFC定調,在USPTO的disclaimer並不能約束IPR程序(如同民事法院程序),如同在地院的disclaimer僅能約束在地院的後續審理程序一般。
轉移審理法院的限制 - Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960)
美國最高法院於1960年作出「Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960)」(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/363/335/)決定,其中針對管轄地變更的限制提出意見。
案件資訊:
議題:是否被告能在地方法院審理訴訟時(主要是針對民事訴訟)基於28 U.S. Code § 1404 轉移案件到原告沒有權利提起告訴的地區?("The instant cases present the question whether a District Court, in which a civil action has been properly brought, is empowered by § 1404 (a) to transfer the action, on the motion of the defendant, to a district in which the plaintiff did not have a right to bring it.")
判決日:June 13, 1960
美國最高法院在"Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960)"案中,指出,根據28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),一件在地方法院審理的民事案件,即便基於被告提出的請求,仍不被允許轉移案件到原告無權提起告訴的地方法院!
這裡提到,(a) 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)規定的"where it might have been brought"並不能解釋為在被告同意下可以重新提起(rebrought)訴訟的地區;(b) 在相同法條下,地方法院可以轉移案件到其他地院的權力並不是根基於被告的希求或是放棄主張,而是基於被轉移的法院是原告可以提起訴訟的地方法院。
因此,即便被告有權提起案件轉移的請求,但是還是要轉移到原告也有權興訟的地區。
最高法院意見:https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/363/335/
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 US 335 - Supreme Court 1960(全文):https://scholar.google.com.tw/scholar_case?case=15345056117313717082&q=Hoffman+v.+Blaski,+363+U.S.+335+(1960)&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&as_vis=1
Ron
2022年11月29日 星期二
Way to Test Distinctness (MPEP )
If the application under examination is the later-filed application, or both applications are filed on the same day, only a one-way determination of distinctness is needed in resolving the issue of double patenting, i.e., whether the invention claimed in the application would have been anticipated by, or an obvious variation of, the invention claimed in the patent. See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1438, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (the court applied a one-way test where both applications were filed the same day). If a claimed invention in the application would have been obvious over a claimed invention in the patent, there would be an unjustified timewise extension of the patent and a nonstatutory double patenting rejection is proper. See MPEP § 804, subsection II.B.2.(a) above.
Similarly, even if the application under examination is the earlier-filed application, only a one-way determination of distinctness is needed to support a double patenting rejection in the absence of a finding: (A) that "the PTO is solely responsible for any delays" in prosecution of the earlier-filed application (In re Hubbell, 709 F.3d 1140, 1150, 106 USPQ2d 1032, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2013); and (B) that the applicant could not have filed the conflicting claims in a single (i.e., the earlier-filed) application ( In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 229 USPQ 678 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
If the patent is the later-filed application, the question of whether the timewise extension of the right to exclude granted by a patent is justified or unjustified must be addressed. A two-way test is to be applied only when the applicant could not have filed the claims in a single application and the Office is solely responsible for any delays.In re Berg, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The two-way exception can only apply when the applicant could not avoid separate filings, and even then, only if the PTO controlled the rates of prosecution to cause the later filed species claims to issue before the claims for a genus in an earlier application . . . In Berg’s case, the two applications could have been filed as one, so it is irrelevant to our disposition who actually controlled the respective rates of prosecution."); In re Hubbell, 709 F.3d 1140, 106 USPQ2d 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2013)("[P]rosecution choices resulted in the foreseeable consequence that the ′685 patent issued before the application claims on appeal. Given these circumstances, and because it is undisputed that the PTO was not solely responsible for the delay, Hubbell is not entitled to a two-way obviousness analysis." 709 F.3d at 1150, 106 USPQ2d at 1039.); see also In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applicant’s voluntary decision to obtain early issuance of claims directed to a species and to pursue prosecution of previously rejected genus claims in a continuation is a considered election to postpone by the applicant and not administrative delay). Unless the record clearly shows administrative delay caused solely by the Office and that applicant could not have avoided filing separate applications, the examiner may use the one-way distinctness determination and shift the burden to applicant to show why a two-way distinctness determination is required.
When making a two-way distinctness determination, where appropriate, it is necessary to apply the obviousness analysis twice, first analyzing the obviousness of the application claims in view of the patent claims, and then analyzing the obviousness of the patent claims in view of the application claims. Where a two-way distinctness determination is required, a nonstatutory double patenting rejection based on obviousness is appropriate only where each analysis leads to a conclusion that the claimed invention is an obvious variation of the invention claimed in the other application/patent. If either analysis does not lead to a conclusion of obviousness, no double patenting rejection of the obviousness-type is made, but this does not necessarily preclude a nonstatutory double patenting rejection based on equitable principles. In re Schneller, 397 F.2d 350, 158 USPQ 210 (CCPA 1968).
Although a delay in the processing of applications before the Office that causes patents to issue in an order different from the order in which the applications were filed is a factor to be considered in determining whether a one-way or two-way distinctness determination is necessary to support a double patenting rejection, it may be very difficult to assess whether the administrative process is solely responsible for a delay in the issuance of a patent. On the one hand, it is applicant who presents claims for examination and pays the issue fee. On the other hand, the resolution of legitimate differences of opinion that must be resolved in an appeal process or the time spent in an interference proceeding can significantly delay the issuance of a patent. Nevertheless, the reasons for the delay in issuing a patent have been considered in assessing the propriety of a double patenting rejection. Thus, in Pierce v. Allen B. DuMont Laboratories, Inc., 297 F.2d 323, 131 USPQ 340 (3d. Cir. 1961), the court found that administrative delay may justify the extension of patent rights beyond 17 years but "a considered election to postpone acquisition of the broader [patent after the issuance of the later filed application] should not be tolerated." In Pierce, the patentee elected to participate in an interference proceeding [after all claims in the application had been determined to be patentable] whereby the issuance of the broader patent was delayed by more than 7 years after the issuance of the narrower patent. The court determined that the second issued patent was invalid on the ground of double patenting. Similarly, in In re Emert, 124 F.3d 1458, 44 USPQ2d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the court found that the one-way test is appropriate where applicants, rather than the Office, had significant control over the rate of prosecution of the application at issue. In support of its finding that the applicants were responsible for delaying prosecution of the application during the critical period, the court noted that the applicants had requested and received numerous time extensions in various filings. More importantly, the court noted, after initially receiving an obviousness rejection of all claims, applicants had waited the maximum period to reply (6 months), then abandoned the application in favor of a substantially identical continuation application, then received another obviousness rejection of all claims, again waited the maximum period to reply, and then again abandoned the application in favor of a second continuation application substantially identical to the original filing. On the other hand, in General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 23 USPQ2d 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the court did not hold the patentee accountable for a delay in issuing the first-filed application until after the second-filed application issued as a patent, even where the patentee had intentionally refiled the first-filed application as a continuation-in-part after receiving a Notice of Allowance indicating that all claims presented were patentable. Where, through no fault of the applicant, the claims in a later-filed application issue first, an obvious-type double patenting rejection is improper, in the absence of a two-way distinctness determination, because the applicant does not have complete control over the rate of progress of a patent application through the Office. In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 19 USPQ2d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1991). While acknowledging that allowance of the claims in the earlier-filed application would result in the timewise extension of an invention claimed in the patent, the court in Braat was of the view that the extension was justified under the circumstances, indicating that a double patenting rejection would be proper only if the claimed inventions were obvious over each other — a two-way distinctness determination.
Ron
2022年11月28日 星期一
USPTO將研究無形資產怎麼運用NFT
2022年11月15日 星期二
禁制令的範圍要明確不應過廣 - Int'l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2004)
本篇討論前一篇( ABC Corp. I v. Schedule "A" (Fed. Cir. 2022))討論設計專利侵權案例中對於"禁制令"發出的引用案例 - "International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 383 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004)"。
案件資訊:
原告/專利權人:International Rectifier Corporation ("IR")
侵權被告:IXYS Corporation ("IXYS")
系爭專利:US6,476,481
判決日:Oct 20, 2004
系爭專利獲准當天,原告IR對被告IXYS提出侵權告訴,IXYS並沒有否認侵權,而是去修改被告侵權產品,間接承認原本的半導體元件設計有侵權的問題,IXYS反擊的重點是質疑原告提出的永久禁制令(permanent injunction)請求。地方法院判決是同意原告IR請求,發出永久禁制令的簡易判決。(根據判決書提到IR同時提起其他9件訴訟,推論系爭專利算是有點分量)
系爭專利US6,476,481關於可加強電容量的MOSFET半導體元件。
1. A semiconductor device of increased current capacity without an increased size; said semiconductor device comprising a semiconductor device die; a plurality of bonding wires; a die mounting pad and a plurality of parallel spaced external conductors; at least one of said parallel spaced external conductors having a first bond wire post at one end thereof; the bottom of said die being fixed to the top surface of said die mounting pad; a plurality of said bonding wires being bonded at one end thereof to the top surface of said die and at the other end thereof to said bond wire post; a plastic housing for enclosing said die; said plurality of spaced conductors extending from the interior of said plastic housing, through a side wall of said housing to the exterior of said housing; the laterally outermost two of said plurality of spaced external conductors being reentrantly bent and penetrating said side wall of said housing so that said laterally outermost two conductors will have a greater spacing at said side wall than at their free ends thereby increasing the creepage distance along the surface of said side wall.
地方法院階段,特別的是,IXYS並未否認原本的產品侵害了系爭專利的範圍,但是提出改良版,原告IR也沒有因此修改訴狀而針對改良後的被告侵權產品,IXYS也撤回對IR系爭專利提出無效與不可執行(unenforceable)主張權利的辯護主張。
如此,原告IR在其訴訟主張中,因為IXYS承認的侵權產品為少量,IR表示願意對少量侵權行為放棄蓄意侵權或是損害賠償的主張,僅請求地院作出侵權判決,但是其中有個陷阱,伴隨著一個永久禁制令的命令:(1)系爭專利有效,而可執行;(2)IXYS特定數量的產品侵權成立;(3)IXYS相關人員被通知禁令。
IXYS提出限制性的反對意見(limited opposition),反對上述禁制令可以針對未來的侵權行為,表示禁制令涵蓋的範圍過廣,違反Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure。
Rule 65. Injunctions and Restraining Orders(https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_65)
...
(d) Contents and Scope of Every Injunction and Restraining Order.(禁制令的內容)
(1) Contents. Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order must:
(A) state the reasons why it issued;(應說明為何發出禁制令)
(B) state its terms specifically; and(應明確指出禁制的項目)
(C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.(以合理的細節描述被禁的行為或被要求的行為)
(2) Persons Bound.
The order binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise: (A) the parties; (B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B).
(以下截圖是2004年判決摘錄的)
IXYS主張禁制令應僅針對最初被告的產品,並認為,如果IR認為經過修改的設計仍侵權,應該提起另一侵權訴訟,IXYS也保留提起不侵權主張、系爭專利無效以及無法執行的反訴權利。
但地方法院否決IXYS主張,並對IXYS產品(不分原本或是修改後的)發出永久禁制令。
CAFC階段:
根據Rule 65(d),CAFC的態度是,此法條就是要避免過廣的永久禁制令(永遠被禁!),特別是避免涵蓋到"未來"侵權的行為。
對於原告IR而言,認為禁制令中沒有必要明確用文字限制侵權的裝置,認為聯邦法條已經解釋禁制令的限制。但就CAFC而言,這樣的禁制令是有瑕疵並違反Rule 65(d),認為地院發出禁制令並不符合"聯邦民事訴訟規則(Federal Rule of Civil Procedure)Rule 65(d)"規定,CAFC否決地院發出的永久禁制令,發回重審要求地院針對適當的範圍發出禁制令。
判決文:https://casetext.com/case/international-rectifier-corp-v-ixys-corp
Ron
2022年11月10日 星期四
外觀商標與其是否是功能性外觀的討論 - SoClean, Inc. v. Sunset Healthcare Solutions, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2022)
原告SoClean先對Sunset提出兩件專利侵權訴訟,很特別的,第二件專利侵權訴訟改成商標侵權訴訟,地方法院將兩件合併審查。
法院重申發出初步禁制令的四個要件:
Sunset根據15 U.S. Code § 1119要求地方法院如果註冊商標有瑕疵應該去校正,然而,CAFC認為Sunset有舉證責任,且SoClean沒有需要證明甚麼,因此判決地方法院並沒有因為拒絕審理審查商標權過程而有濫用裁量權的問題。
就來看系爭商標是否本身是功能性,或是已經通過組合變得並非純粹的功能性外觀?
2022年11月3日 星期四
我國設計專利之「圖像設計」筆記
- 圖像設計的「設計名稱」需要記載應用在何物上,可以寫在範圍很廣的"電腦程式產品"的應用上,例如名稱可以是:「電腦程式產品之圖像」、「電腦程式產品之圖形化使用者介面」、「電腦程式產品之操作選單」或「電腦程式產品之視窗畫面」。但仍可寫成範圍較小的應用上,例如「手機之圖像」、「提款機之圖像」或「洗衣機之圖形化使用者介面」。